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Oklahoma is generally viewed as a rural state. Agriculture is an important sector 
of Oklahoma's economy. Oklahoma's gross state product (GSP) grew from $11.2 billion 
in 1970 to $59.2 billion in 1990. Cash receipts valued at the farm and ranch gates, 
almost doubled from about $1.5 billion in 1980 to $2.8 billion in 1990 after adjustments 
for inflation (Applegate). In addition, the associated industries of agriculture generated 
an output of approximately $5.5 billion in 1990. Therefore, a total of 15.4 percent of 
the GSP is generated from production agriculture and associated industries (Scifres and 
Osborn). 
Winter wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) is the predominant field crop produced in 
Oklahoma. In 1990, 9.65 million crop acres were harvested in the state. Two-thirds of 
these harvested acres were in winter wheat. Moreover, Oklahoma ranked third among 
all states in wheat production and second in winter wheat production (Oklahoma 
Agricultural Statistics). 
The production of hard red winter wheat for grain increased substantially during 
the period of 1970 to 1990, especially in the mid-1970's. Much of this increased 
production has been attributed to improvements in technology. Figure 1 shows the share 
of cash receipts excluding government payments attributable to wheat and other crops in 
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Figure 1. Cash Receipts Excluding Government Payments Attributable to Wheat and to all other Crops in 




Livestock, especially beef production, is also a vitally important sector in 
Oklahoma (Scifres and Osborn). The importance of livestock in generating income 
increased gradually during the period from 1975 to 1990 (Figure 2). Continued growth 
in livestock production is dependent in part upon locally produced forages and feed 
grams. 
As a result of the unique climate, soils, and growing season, livestock may be 
grazed on wheat forage in the state during the winter months, typically from late 
November to early March. If the livestock are removed from the wheat prior to the 
crop's jointing stage, the wheat will mature and produce a grain crop (Rodriguez et al.). 
The forage value of the 1991 wheat crop, a season during which an estimated 3.75 
million of the state's 7.4 million acres of wheat were grazed, was estimated to be at least 
$135 million (Hom; Scifres and Osborn). 
Government policies influence the economics of production and have widespread 
consequences for individual farmers as well as for the state. For example, in Oklahoma 
during the past 50 years direct government payments to farmers have varied significantly 
depending on prevailing policy and production levels of targeted commodities. Direct 
government payments declined from $25 million in 1940 to $6 million in 1955. They 
increased to $118 million in 1970 and decreased again to $19 million in 1975. Direct 
federal government subsidies increased to $319 million in 1990, when the payments 
accounted for about eight percent of the cash receipts generated by agriculture (Scifres 
and Osborn). 
The state's wheat producers are confronted with many uncertainties. Wheat grain 
and forage yields vary with weather and market prices vary from season-to-season in 
Livestock 
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response to changes in the international wheat market. In the major wheat producing 
region of the state, most of the crop acres are monocropped to continuous wheat. 
Because of the climate there are relatively few opportunities to diversify to summer 
crops. However, there are limited opportunities to mitigate production risk in a given 
season by altering planting dates, tillage systems, and varieties (Epplin et al., 1993). 
Supplementary winter grazing of the wheat forage is a major diversification practice. 
Participation in government programs is also an important risk management tool. 
Society at large is increasingly concerned about externalities. Wheat production 
practices, especially tillage systems, influence external consequences such as soil erosion 
and water quality. In 1985, federal legislation was passed which initiated a process of 
internalizing the costs of soil erosion. Farmers who farm highly erodible lands will be 
required to implement soil conserving production practices to maintain eligibility for 
direct agricultural payments and other federal programs (Aw-Hassan and Stoecker). 
The federal wheat commodity program which has provided subsidy payments to 
participating farmers in years of low market prices has played an important role in 
reducing the price risk of producing wheat in Oklahoma. However, by 1995, those who 
farm highly erodible land will be required to fully implement a conservation compliance 
plan to continue to qualify for federal commodity program deficiency payments. 
In Oklahoma, over seven million acres exceed the USDA's highly erodible 
classification (Stiegler). Most of the affected acreage has historically been in continuous , 
wheat production. In Oklahoma most conservation plans which have been prepared for 
implementation on highly erodible land include the use of a residue management 
program. Residue management typically refers to the use of a production system (tillage 
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practices) which will result in retaining plant residue on the soil surface throughout the 
year. Farmers of highly erodible land, who continue to use conventional tillage practices 
and bury old crop residue to control weeds and prepare a seedbed for the next crop, will 
be out of compliance and jeopardize the loss of government payments. Studies have been 
conducted to evaluate the consequences of alternative tillage systems and government 
commodity programs on risk (Helms et al., Gillespie et al., Williams et al., and Olson 
and Eidman). However, little research has been conducted to estimate the impacts that 
conservation compliance requirements will have on farmers who historically have been 
continuous wheat producers in the Great Plains (Rowell et al., Aw-Hassan and Stoecker). 
The purpose of the present study is to generate additional information which could 
be used by farmers confronted with the conservation compliance requirements. The 
study will use actual yields obtained from an experiment station study in which different 
tillage systems (residue management alternatives) were compared. It will also 
incorporate the consequences of noncompliance and nonparticipation as well as 
compliance and participation in federal commodity programs. In addition, the 
diversification strategy of grazing wheat forage during the winter months will be 
evaluated. Hence, the two major risk management tools available to continuous wheat 
producers in Oklahoma will be incorporated into the study. The design of the study is 
to determine risk efficient tillage and wheat-stocker strategies for a representative 
Oklahoma wheat-stocker farm given existing and proposed government policies. 
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Objectives 
The overall objective of this research is to determine efficient production 
strategies for continuous wheat producers in Oklahoma. The specific objectives are to: 
1) Determine risk efficient tillage strategies for a representative Oklahoma 
wheat farm given existing and proposed government policies. 
2) Determine risk efficient tillage and wheat-stocker strategies for a 
representative Oklahoma wheat-stocker farm given existing and proposed 
government policies. 
3) Determine the impact of proposed government policies on farm income. 
Organization of the Study 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter II 
includes a review of literature of studies of the economics of alternative tillage systems, 
government program impacts on the economics of production alternatives, methods used 
to determine risk efficient.farm plans given the existence of government programs, and 
a synopsis of the federal wheat commodity program relevant to producers in Oklahoma. 
The focus of the material presented in Chapter m is on the conceptual framework and 
methods for selecting risk efficient farm plans. 
The research model, including the objective function, activities, constraints, 
ass1,1mptions, and data sources used to conduct the study are presented in Chapter IV. 
The risk efficient strategies and other results are presented in Chapter V. A presentation 
of the :findings and conclusions of the work are included in Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter includes a review of selected literature pertinent to the economics of 
alternative tillage systems, the impact of government programs on the economics of 
production alternatives, and methods used to select risk efficient farm plans given 
variable yields and prices. The chapter also includes a brief description of the 1990 
wheat commodity program as well as some proposed government policies which if 
implemented would impact upon wheat and stocker producers in Oklahoma. 
Outcomes in terms of yields, prices, and net revenue from dryland wheat 
production in Oklahoma are not certain. Weather, pest populations, and disease 
incidence vary from year-to-year, and from farm-to-farm and field-to-field in a given 
year. Crop yields vary in response to the stochastic environment in which they are 
grown. In years of unfavorable weather or relatively high populations of pests, crop 
yields may be reduced such that production costs can not be covered. In years of better 
than average weather and few pests, yields may be substantially higher than expected. 
Crop and livestock prices are also stochastic. Season average wheat prices vary 
from year-to-year depending upon global production and use of wheat as well as prices 
for competing food grains. 
Those who produce wheat and stocker cattle in Oklahoma are engaged in a risky 
business. There is some chance that in a given year returns from their efforts will be 
8 
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less than necessary to cover the variable production costs or to meet debt obligations. 
While the potential for losses can not be eliminated, several tools for managing 
production and marketing risks are available to producers. 
One risk management tool that may be used by wheat farmers is to participate in 
government commodity programs which effectively mitigate downside price risk. That 
is, on the average, farmers who elect to participate, generally by idling (or not harvesting 
for grain) a specified percent of their normal wheat acres, are guaranteed that the price 
will not fall below a federally mandated floor price (loan rate). 
Government Commodity Programs 
Government intervention in the marketplace began with depression era of 1930's. 
Since 1933, several production and marketing control programs has been used for many 
commodities including wheat. The original policies were designed primarily to increase 
and stabilize the market price of agricultural commodities by imposing a mandatory 
restriction of total production or amounts marketed (Ray). 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and subsequent farm bills enacted 
during the 1930's set up nearly every farm program institution that exists in 1983 
(Rasmussen). While parts of the initial 1933 bills were declared unconstitutional, the 
basic farm policy remained intact (Knutson et al.) including: the goal of parity price, 
the establishment of price support loans through the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC), provisions for controlling production through diversion payments, provisions for 
commodity storage, and provisions for crop insurance. 
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The parity price is defined as that price which today gives a unit of the 
commodity the same purchasing power as it had in 1910-1914. Non-recourse loans were 
begun in 1934 and have continued through the years as a means for linking price 
supports with production and marketing controls. The Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) offered these loans to eligible producers as credit usually for a marketing year. 
Stored grain is used as collateral for the loan. The farmer may forfeit the grain in lieu 
of repaying the loan. Forfeiture would be an appropriate strategy if the market price for 
the stored grain is less than the federally mandated loan rate. Hence, the loan rate is an 
effective floor price. 
The conservation compliance provision of the Food Security Act (FSA) of 1985, 
as amended by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act (FACTA) of 1990, 
applies to highly erodible fields in which annually tilled crops are planted. Its purpose 
is to discourage the production of crops on highly erodible cropland. Farmers must fully 
implement a conservation plan by December 31, 1994 to be eligible for certain USDA 
program benefits. The eligibility of programs that are subjected to compliance with the 
highly erodible land under the FSA are: price and income supports, crop insurance, 
Farmers Home Administration Loans, Commodity Credit Corporation storage payments, 
and CRP. 
FACTA expanded the number of programs for which eligibility is subject to 
conservation compliance. Included in the group are: Agricultural Conservation 
Program, CRP cost-share payments, Disaster Assistance, including the emergency 
Conservation Program and Livestock Feed Program, PL-566-the small Watershed 
11 
Program (loans and cost share), Great Plains Conservation Program, and Water Quality 
Incentives Program. Selected government program terms are defined in Table 1. 
Economics of Alternative Tillage Systems 
Traditionally, conventional tillage has played an important role in controlling 
weeds. However, the area under reduced tillage is increasing and accounted for almost 
one-third of the area farmed in the United States in 1982 (Christensen and Magleby). 
In general, reduced tillage systems substitute the use of herbicides for tillage operations 
to accomplish weed control. 
Tice et al. evaluated the economics of seven tillage systems for continuous wheat 
production. They concluded that as a result of the expensive herbicide program, no-
tillage was the most costly alternative. However, yield differences were not considered. 
Lockeretz reported that reduction in production costs per acre for several crops, 
including wheat, from conservation tillage was less than 10 percent and in some cases 
the cost of the additional herbicide offset the reduction in tillage costs. 
Jolly et al. examined farm-level risks and returns for corn and soybeans grown 
in rotation for three conservation tillage systems and one conventional moldboard plow 
system. Experimental yield data obtained during the 1976 to 1980 growing seasons were 
used in the analysis. Returns over operating costs and returns to land and management 
were estimated. Standard deviations of returns were used as a measure of risk. They 
concluded that based upon short run economic criteria the conventional system was 














A voluntary land retirement program conducted by 
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) in which 
participating farmers idle a prescribed portion of 
their crop acreage base of wheat, feed grains, cotton, 
or rice 
Requires farmers with highly erodible cropland to 
implement an approved conservation plan. The plan 
must be completed by 1995 for the farm operation to 
remain eligible for specified federal program benefits 
A combination of land uses and practices to improve 
and protect soil productivity and to prevent soil 
deterioration 
A program designed to reduce erosion on 40-45 
million acres of farmland. It was authorized by the 
Food Security Act of 1985. Producers who sign 
contracts agree to convert highly erodible cropland to 
approved conservation uses for 10 years. In 
exchange, producers receive an annual rental 
payment 
Any farming methods that maintain effective ground 
cover and disturb the soil as little as possible. In 
addition, it provides for weed control, seed 
germination, and plant growth 
Base acreage determined by historical cropping 
practices. It is a farm's 5-year average acreage of 
wheat or feed grains and 3-year average of cotton or 
rice planted for harvest, plus land not planted 
because of acreage reduction or diversion programs 
A payment made by the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) to farmers participating in wheat, 
feed grain, rice, or cotton programs. It is based on 
the difference between the target price and either the 
higher of market price or price support (loan) rate 
Payment made directly to producers including 
deficiency payments, annual paid land diversion 
payments or conservation reserve payments 
12 
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Table 1. ( continued) 
Loan Rate (price support 
rate) 
Non-recourse Loans 





The price per unit at which the Commodity Credit 
Corporation provides loans to farmers enabling them 
to hold their crops for later sale 
Loans based upon the price support made by the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to 
participating farmers. Stored commodity is used as 
collateral for the loan. The farmer either may forfeit 
the commodity in lieu of repaying the loan or repay 
the loan with interest 
This provision requires mandatory 15 percent 
reduction in payment acreage. However, producers 
are allowed to plant any crop on this acreage, except 
fruits and vegetables 
A price set by the USDA which is used to calculate 
the deficiency payments. The 1990 Farm Bill set the 
wheat target price at $4 for crop years 1990 through 
1995 
The planting flexibility concept used in the Food, 
Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act (FACTA) 
of 1990 which divides the crop acreage base into 
three categories: acreage removed from production 
under ARP; the permitted acreage on which program 
crop is planted and deficiency payments may be paid; 
and the nonpayment acreage on which producer may 
plant any Commodity Credit Corporation -- specified 
crop ( except fruit and vegetable) but do not receive 
deficiency payments 
A program provision that allows wheat and feed 
grain producers to devote all or portion of their 
permitted acreage to conserving uses and receive 
deficiency payments on that acreage. The program 
makes deficiency payments for a maximum of 92 
percent of a farm's maximum payment acreage 
Source: USDA. Provisions of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade 
Act of 1990. ERS Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 624, June 1991. 
14 
preferred. That is, in the short run, growers who adopt a conservation tillage system 
may incur an economic penalty. 
Doster et al. used crop budgets to compare six tillage systems for continuous com 
and a com-soybeans rotation in Indiana for different soil types. Yield data were obtained 
from field trials. Budgets were estimated for twelve hypothetical farms to compare the 
effects of tillage systems on net returns. They concluded that alternative tillage systems 
that did not include a moldboard plow were economically competitive. They did not 
have access to yields over a historic time period and did not consider differences in risk 
across systems. 
·Klemme used. stochastic dominance to compare a conventional tillage system with 
several alternatives including till-plant and no-till for com and soybean production in 
north central Indiana. Experimental yield data over the period from 1975 to 1982 were 
used in the analysis. To focus on the effects of stochastic yields, input and output prices 
were held constant in 1982 dollars. Klemme concluded that the conventional tillage 
system was more economical in the short run relative to the alternatives evaluated. 
However, the alternative systems would have been found to be more competitive if 
external costs such as those associated with soil erosion had been incorporated into the 
analysis. 
Epplin and Tice reported cost estimates for alternative tillage systems for 
continuous winter wheat production. They found that production costs were higher per 
acre for no-till than for conventional tillage systems. However, they did not have data 
to consider differences in yield or yield variation between the systems. 
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Setia used expected utility maximization and safety-first criteria to compare three 
alternative conservation management systems. A stochastic modelling system which 
models soil loss and economic returns was used to calculate annual net return per acre, 
variability in annual net returns, soil loss, and variability in annual soil loss for each 
management system. Monte Carlo simulation was used to overcome the problem of 
predicting directly the effect of price and yield on variability in net returns. Optimal soil 
conservation management systems were found to vary, depending upon the risk 
preferences of the managers. 
Williams used stochastic dominance to evaluate alternative tillage systems for 
wheat and grain sorghum production on the Central Great Plains of Kansas. He 
concluded that conservation tillage systems would be preferred by risk averse managers. 
He also evaluated the consequences of crop insurance. He found that improvements in 
crop yields and reductions in fuel, labor, and repair costs more than offset the increased 
chemical costs of the conservation tillage system. 
Williams, et al. (1987) used stochastic dominance to compare reduced tillage 
systems for wheat and sorghum production in the Central Great Plains of Kansas with 
conventional tillage. Experimental yield data and average seasonal prices from 11 years 
(1973-1983) were used along with the cost of production of 1984 to compute the 
expected return distributions. They concluded that, in general, reduced tillage systems 
generated higher returns than other cropping systems and that using reduced tillage 
methods would be the optimal management strategy. 
Mikesell et al. used stochastic dominance with respect to a function to compare 
three tillage systems (conventional; ridge; no-till) and three cropping alternatives 
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(continuous grain sorghum; continuous soybeans; a soybean-grain sorghum rotation). 
They concluded that conventional tillage for continuous grain sorghum would be 
preferred by risk averse managers. However, they found that their results are sensitive 
to production costs and yields. 
Henderson and Stonehouse used linear programming to evaluate tillage systems 
for five soil textures and two slopes. They concluded that fall plowing was the most 
profitable system on sandy loam and silt loam soils. Zero tillage was the optimum 
system on loam soils. However, inclusion of a penalty for soil loss had little influence 
on the optimum solution. 
Epplin and Beck used stochastic. dominance to evaluate three alternative tillage 
systems for winter wheat production in the southern Great Plains. Two of the alternative 
production systems were one-till and no-till which used herbicides to control weeds. The 
third alternative was a conventional tillage system. Grain yields were obtained from a 
four-year yield experiment station trial. Forage yield data were not available. However, 
the value of forage was estimated by budgeting returns and costs of a stocker steer. 
Estimates of net returns to land, management, and overhead were computed for the three 
tillage systems and four alternative planting months. One of the conventional tillage 
strategies was found to be preferred. 
Williams et al. (1989) used stochastic dominance with respect to a function 
(SDWRF) to compare conservation tillage systems (no-till) with conventional tillage 
systems for continuous grain sorghum, soybeans, continuous wheat, and rotations 
including these crops. Yield data were obtained from experiments conducted in 
northeastern and west central Kansas over a ten year period. Conventional tillage 
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systems were found to be the most risk efficient strategies for risk-averse individuals. 
However, intermediate tillage systems and external costs associated with soil erosion 
were not incorporated into the analysis. 
Several studies have been conducted in Oklahoma to evaluate the impact of 
alternative wheat production systems on input requirements and whole farm machinery 
investment (Epplin et al., 1982), production cost (Epplin et al., 1983), and soil erosion 
(Tice and Epplin). Also, the impact of alternative production was compared for different 
size farms (Epplin and Tice). 
The review of prior studies of the impact of alternative tillage systems on the 
profitability of crop production suggests that conservation tillage has little short-run 
advantage over conventional tillage. However, conservation tillage systems may be 
economically competitive when external costs are considered. Moreover, by 1995, 
farmers who till highly erodible soil will be required to implement soil conservation 
compliance plans to continue to qualify for federal commodity program deficiency 
payments. 
Government Program Impacts on the Economics 
of Production Alternatives 
Government programs directly influence agricultural production. Numerous 
researchers have conducted economic analysis to evaluate the impacts of government 
programs on the relative economics of alternative farming systems. 
Scott and Baker used quadratic programming (QP) to derive the mean-variance 
efficient frontier for a typical cash grain farm in central Illinois. The production 
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activities included com, soybeans, oats, wheat, and idle land (set aside) to be used to 
meet the requirement for the 1972 g_ovemment feed-grain program. Ten years of yield 
and price data were used to calculate the mean expected return and variance-covariance 
matrix. 
The model was structured to evaluate the impact of the government price support 
and land set aside programs on farm income and optimal cropping patterns. Scott and 
Baker found that the preferred strategy for a risk neutral farmer was to produce only 
com. The preferred strategy for a farmer with moderate aversion to risk included a 
combination of three acres of soybeans for every acre of com and the minimum amount 
of set aside required for participation in the government program. However, they 
concluded that risk averse farmers would maximize their utility by implementing a plan 
of about equal acreage of com and soybeans along with the required set aside. 
Musser and Stamoulis used QP to investigate the hypothesis that federal 
agricultural commodity programs generally reduce income risk for farm firms. They 
used the Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 and constructed a representative farm model 
for Georgia. The model was used to drive efficient mean-variance frontiers for a 
participating and nonparticipating farm. Market prices were used when they exceeded 
the loan rate. Deficiency payments and disaster payments were added to the gross 
revenue for each crop at the appropriate historical level to calculate the distribution of 
net returns. They concluded that participation in the government program would be 
preferable to nonparticipation for most farmers. 
Kramer and Pope used stochastic dominance to analyze benefits of participation 
in the farm commodity program under the Food and Agricultural Act of 1977. The 
19 
federal commodity nonrecourse loan rates were used to determine the value of crops and 
target prices were used to determine the deficiency payments to producers. They used 
the USDA index of prices paid for production expenses to deflate prices to adjust for 
inflation. None of the deflated price data required detrending. The yield data were 
detrended as deemed appropriate. Cost data were obtained from the University of 
California Cooperative Extension Service budgets; Kramer and Pope concluded that 
small changes in program parameters affect participation and that farm size also can 
influence participation. 
Mcsweeny et al. used the mean-squared forecast error (MSFE) as a measure of 
uncertainty in a quadratic risk programming model. They argued that the use of variance 
of realized returns assumes that the distribution of realized returns is the same as the 
distribution anticipated by the decision maker prior to the start of production which is not 
consistent with the conceptual model of how farmers form expectations. They concluded 
that the MSFE method is more appropriate than the commonly used procedures based 
only on realized market data and selected detrending methods. 
Helms et al. used a whole-farm simulation analysis to investigate producer 
preferences for adoption of alternative tillage strategies under provision of both 1981 and 
1985 farm bills for a nonirrigated wheat farm. They concluded that government 
payments play a significant role in decisions about tillage and other production practices. 
Moreover, results of their stochastic dominance analysis showed that a risk-averse 
producer would optimize utility by selecting a combination-tillage practice and participate 
in the government program. 
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Richardson et al. used the farm level income policy simulation model (FLIPSIM) 
to quantified the economic impact of the conservation compliance provision of the 1985 
farm bill for a representative dry land cotton in Dawson County, Texas. Six management 
scenarios were simulated over a 5-year period (1989-1993). They concluded that most 
farmers would either elect to comply with the required conservation plans or enroll in 
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). Average income would decline for those who 
chose not to comply with the conservation requirements. 
Gillespie et al. calculated the costs and returns for 35 crop-tillage combinations 
for the Sand Mountain region of Alabama under the conservation provisions of the 1985 
farm bill. They found that the most profitable crop and associated practice was no-till 
straight-row com. The most profitable farm program was the optional paid land 
diversion program, which allocated 35 percent of the base acreage to set-aside purposes. 
They concluded that farmers could conserve soil under the 1985 farm bill and continue 
to earn a high net return. 
Hickman et al. used enterprise budgeting to evaluate the impact of conservation 
compliance requirements on a representative northeastern Kansas farm. Numerous 
strategies for achieving compliance were considered. They used long-range (1990-1995) 
estimates for target prices, cash prices, and set-aside. Conservation compliance options 
were found to have higher net returns than noncompliance options. However, they 
concluded that net returns would decline as a result of the legislation. 
Perry et al. found that most researchers who have evaluated the crop-mix decision 
using mean-variance models have relied on historical data (yields and prices). They 
argue that historical data may not fully reflect current conditions, particularly when 
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decision involve government-supported crops. They developed generalized equations for 
calculating per-acre income, mean, and variance values for both government supported 
and non-programs crops. These equations can be summarized as follows: 
P•Y 
P • Y + G • (T - P) 
RP = P • Y + G • (L - P) + G • (T - L) 
0-M-~•Y+G•~-~+G•~-~ 
A • Y + G • (L - A) + G • (T - L) 
where: 





RP = gross income per acre of planted cropland under the program, 
T = the target price, 
L = the formula loan rate, 
A = the adjusted loan, 
M = the marketing loan, and 
G = proven yield. 
Williams et al. (1990) used stochastic dominance to analyze conventional tillage,. 
a two-tillage system, and no-tillage, for five crops rotations; wheat-fallow, grain 
sorghum-fallow, continuous wheat, continuous sorghum, and wheat-grain sorghum-
fallow. Four scenarios involving participation and nonparticipation in government 
commodity programs were examined. Yields from field experiments and historical price 
data for the period (1976-1986) and 1986 production costs were used to calculate 
distributions of net returns. Loan rate, target prices, and the acreage reduction 
requirement for 1987 cropping year were used in the calculations. They concluded that 
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risk averse managers should select conventional tillage wheat-grain sorghum-fallow 
rotation when government payments are not considered. However, the results are quite 
sensitive to production costs and yield changes. Participation in government programs 
increase average net return and lower variation of return. Government commodity 
program provisions did not encourage the use of the no-tillage system. 
Hoag and Holloway used mixed integer programming to examined the profitability 
of participation in commodity programs on seventeen surveyed North Carolina farms. 
They concluded that individual farm acreage base and crop yield strongly affect the 
profitability of conservation compliance. Farms with more base acreage and higher base 
yields for program crops have a greater incentive to comply. 
Rowell et al. evaluated the economic impact of conservation compliance for a 
representative farm in Kansas. They concluded that production in violation of 
conservation compliance would result in lower net returns. 
Aw-Hassan and Stoecker used the EPIC simulation model to provide an estimate 
of the long-term impacts of alternative tillage systems on soil erosion and soil erosion on 
wheat yield. They evaluated four tillage systems for continuous wheat production for 
Grant County, Oklahoma. They found that under the current conservation compliance 
policy a disk-chisel tillage system would meet the residue requirement on highly erodible 
land and would result in higher net income than either a moldboard plow or sweep tillage 
system. 
Olson and Eidman presented a theoretical model of the weed control decision and 
developed a MOT AD programming model to study the impact of alternative government 
policies on weed control choices. A representative farm of 400 crop acres for southeast 
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Minnesota was modelled. Herbicide usage, mechanical weed control, and variability of 
federal policy was incorporated into the analysis. They found that the variation in 
returns may influence a farmer to select the herbicide control strategy even though it has 
lower returns than the mechanical weed control system. 
This section has included a review of some studies conducted to evaluate the 
impact of government programs on the relative economics of alternative farming systems. 
In general, participation in government programs is preferable to non-participation. 
Historically, participation in government commodity programs has not encouraged the 
use of conservation tillage. However, farmers will be required to implement soil 
conserving production practices on highly erodible lands to maintain eligibility for direct 
agricultural payments and other federal programs. 
Methods Used to Determine the Efficient Farm 
Plans Given Government Programs 
Farmers who participate in government programs are often required to impose 
restrictions on the acres devoted to program crops on the land that they farm. A variety 
of analytical methods have been used to incorporate the government program 
participation decision into the analysis. 
Enterprise budgeting is a common analytical tool used to evaluate alternative farm 
plans. For example, Gillespie et al., Hickman et al., and Rowell et al. used budgeting 
to evaluate the impact of government commodity programs, including conservation 
compliance, on net returns for a representative farms. These studies computed estimates 
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of the net returns to alternative production systems. However, the returns variability and 
risks associated with each system were not considered. 
To incorporate risk into farm planning analysis, efficiency criteria are frequently 
used in both theoretical and empirical analysis. For example, stochastic dominance has 
been used to analyze the net benefits of participation in farm commodity programs 
(Kramer and Pope). 
Whole farm analysis is a more appropriate method than single enterprise analysis 
for evaluation of alternative tillage systems because changes in machinery requirements 
can have a relatively large impact on capital requirements and income. 
Risk programming is a technique used to determine risk efficient farm plans 
subject to the resources of the farm and institutional constraints. Quadratic programming 
has been used to select risk efficient whole farm plans given government programs (Scott 
and Baker; Musser and Stamoulis; and Mcsweeny, et al.). Market prices were used to 
calculate the crop values when prices exceeded the loan rate. Target prices were used 
to calculate the deficiency payments. Models can be structured to generate efficient 
mean-variance frontiers for participation and nonparticipation situations. Simulation 
models have also been used to generate farm plans given government programs (Helms 
et al.). 
Kramer and Pope and Mcsweeny et al. argued that using historical government 
program parameters would be misleading for a model designed to evaluate current period 
decision making. They suggested that the current program parameters be used as if the 
parameters had been in effect throughout the entire period used to generate the 
distributions of returns. 
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In this section, a review of methods used to incorporate government programs into 
farm models was presented. Most researchers have used a whole farm risk programming 
technique. This study also uses risk programming technique for a whole farm analysis. 
Moreover, it will follow the procedure suggested by Mcsweeny et al. to incorporate the 
government program into the analysis by using the current program parameters as if the 
parameters had been in effect throughout the entire period used to generate the 
distribution of returns for the various production activities. 
CHAPTER ID 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODS FOR 
SELECTING RISK EFFICIENT WHOLE-FARM PLANS 
Planning methods such as budgeting and linear programming that researchers can 
used to systematically evaluate the effect of alternative production systems on the 
profitability of farming have become routine decision making tools. Procedures have 
also been developed to aid with the selection of risk efficient farm production plans. In 
this chapter, the concept of risk is explained. The conceptual framework for farm 
decision making under risk and some empirical techniques of measuring risk are 
discussed. This chapter also includes a review of alternative methods for selecting risk 
efficient whole-farm plans. 
The Conce,pt of Risk 
Risk has been defined in many ways. In 1921, Knight argued that if the 
probabilities of uncertain outcomes are known, the problem of selecting from among 
several alternatives is one of risk. In contrast, if the probabilities are unknown, the 
problem is one of uncertainty. With the introduction of the concept of subjective 
probability, the differentiation between risk and uncertainty has blurred to the extent that 
the terms have become interchangeable in the agricultural economics literature. 
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In applied research, risk is generally defined in the context of variability of 
income or net returns. It is usually quantified by a standard statistical measure of 
dispersion such as variance, standard deviation, or coefficient of variation. Risk may 
also be defined as a chance of loss, or the probability that net income (Y) will fall below 
some disaster level such as: 
Pr (Y < d) = a [3.1] 
where Y is income and d is some disaster level. 
Farm Decision Making Under Risk 
Yields from crop and livestock production activities and market prices for crop 
and livestock products are stochastic variables. Outcomes from crop and livestock 
production vary with weather and other factors such as pests. Farming is a risky 
business. Farm managers encounter many choices from which they must decide upon 
a course of action. These choices ultimately result in a mix or portfolio of enterprises 
and production practices. These decisions may be based upon the criteria of maximizing 
expected income or profit. However, for many farmers the selection criteria may also 
include some consideration of risk. For example, Lin et al. performed an empirical test 
of the profit maximization hypothesis relative to the expected utility maximization 
hypothesis for a group of large scale California farmers. They concluded that the latter 
best explained the behavior of these farmers. 
Under the profit maximization framework, the optimal farm plan for different 
farmers with identical technology and resources will be the same. An optimal linear 
programming solution for a representative farmer selected from a homogeneous group 
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will be useful for all individual farmers in that group. However, under the expected 
utility framework, the optimal farm plan depends on each individual's utility function. 
Often utility functions are expressed in terms of expected income and income variability. 
The classical underlying economic theory of firm management is based upon the 
profit maximization assumption. The basic model is static and deterministic. It is 
appropriate for many types of analysis. However, farming is dynamic and stochastic. 
Economists have developed basic extensions of the deterministic model of the firm in an 
attempt to provide more appropriate tools for decision making. 
The Bemoullian utility theorem provides a useful theoretical basis for the analysis 
of the behavior of individuals in a stochastic environment, that is, an environment in 
which the outcome of alternative actions which influence the welfare of the individual are 
not known with certainty. The theory and empirical application of risk management has 
concentrated on the analysis of the trade-off between expected income and risk as 
measured by the variability of income. This theory is based on the explicit or implicit 
assumption that decision makers possess positive marginal utility for money. Further, 
most decision makers are assumed to be willing to trade-off some expected income to 
reduce the probability of incurring a loss resulting from an uncertain event. 
Consumer theory is built upon the assumption that individuals derive utility from 
the consumption of goods and services which can be purchased with money income. 
Hence, indirectly, utility is a function of income (Freund; Kaiser and Boehlje; Varian). 
A utility function can be written as: 
U = f(Y) [3.2] 
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where Y is the income earned from the execution of a specific farm plan. If the utility 
function of the farmer were known and tractable, a unique optimal farm plan could be 
determined by maximizing the function. Utility theory has been very useful for 
explaining qualitative aspects of the behavior of managers, including farmers. However, 
it is difficult to precisely quantify the utility functions of individuals. 
Utility functions can be elicited directly from an individual by conducting 
carefully designed gambling games with the individuals or through econometric analysis 
(Binswanger; Dillon and Scandizzo). However, such methods are often expensive and 
practical considerations force analysts to assume functional forms that are 
computationally convenient. Utility functions are unique to decision makers and may not 
be stable over time. They may change with income level and other socioeconomic 
conditions of the household (Dillon and Scandizzo; Binswanger). Hazell (1982) 
concluded that direct elicitation of utility functions is not likely to be widely adopted for 
farm planning. 
While efforts to derive utility functions have not been very successful, substantial 
efforts have been devoted to describe the theoretical properties of various functional 
forms. One functional form which has been frequently used is the quadratic. A 
quadratic utility function may be written as follows: 
U(Y) = a + aY + {3Y2 [3.3] 
where a, a and {3 are constants (Hazell and Norton, 1986; Kaiser and Boehlje; and 
Dillon). The expected value of (3.3) is: 
E[U(Y)] = a + aE(Y) + {3E(Y2) [3.4] 
E[U(Y)] = a + aE(Y) + {3E(Y2) - /3E(Y)2 + {3E(Y)2 [3.5] 
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E[U (Y)] = a + aE(Y) + {3V(Y) + {3E(Y)2 [3.6] 
where E(Y) is the mean of income and V(Y) denotes the variance of income. Hence, 
for those farmers for which a quadratic utility function is appropriate, expected utility 
can be specified in terms of mean and variance such that: 
U = f[E(Y), V(Y)] [3.7] 
where E denotes mean or expected income and V refers to the variance of expected 
income. For a given level of utility (U 0 ), an indifference curve depicting the willingness 
of a farmer to forgo some expected income (E) to reduce variance of expected income 
(V) can be plotted in EV space. 
For a rational producer, 0 U must be positive over some range of the utility 
cJE 
function, i.e. if the variance of income is constant, utility increases with an increase in 
expected income. The farmer is expected to prefer farm plans with higher income and 
lower variance. If two farm plans have the same variance, the plan with higher income 
will be preferred. 
A farmer's attitude towards risk can be inferred from the shape of his or her 
utility function. If {3 is positive, it indicates that the decision maker is a risk preferrer 
and variability of income is desired. That is, for a given level of expected income, more 
variance is preferred to less. On the other hand, if /3 is negative, the decision maker is 
said to be risk averse. That is, over some range of expected income the decision maker 
is willing to sacrifice some expected income to reduce ·the variability of income (risk) 
(Dillon, 1971; Kaiser and Boehlje). A decision maker is considered to be risk neutral 
if /3 = 0. 
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Graphically, if a decision makers' utility (on the vertical axis) as a function of 
income (on the horizontal axis) is concave to the origin, the decision maker is said to be 
risk averse. A linear utility function implies risk neutrality. A convex function would 
be appropriate to represent the preferences of a risk preferring decision maker. A 
decision maker may have a utility function with both concave and convex segments 
indicating changes in risk attitudes for different levels of income. Figure 3 includes 
segments of utility functions to indicate the various shapes to represent the three classes 
of decision makers .(risk averse, risk neutral, risk preferring). 
Risk Efficiency Criteria 
A risk efficiency criteria is a decision rule which may be used to compare two or 
more alternatives in terms of expected income and risk. In general, for a given level of 
expected income, an alternative with less risk (variance) is relatively more risk efficient 
than an alternative with more risk. A number of risk efficiency criteria have been 
developed to overcome the problems associated with attempts to directly estimate 
individual utility functions. The advantage of using these criteria is that they may be 
applicable for classes of, rather than for individual, decision makers. 
Mean-variance (EV), mean-absolute deviation (MAD), first degree stochastic 
dominance (FSD), second degree stochastic dominance (SSD), and stochastic dominance 
with respect to a function (SDRF) are examples of risk efficiency criteria. They are 
widely used in both theoretical and empirical analysis. They are appropriate tools for 
risk analysis in situations where a single person, or a group of persons, whose unknown 













Figure 3. Three Functional Forms of Utility Function. 
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are not precisely determined by use of a risk efficiency criterion. Rather, a criterion can 
be used to separate potential alternatives into two mutually exclusive sets - an efficient 
set and an inefficient set. 
Mean-variance (EV) is the simplest approach to efficiency analysis. Alternative 
one is preferred to alternative two if (E(X1) > E(X2) and V(X1) < V(XJ with at least 
one being a strict inequality. Hence, the EV method separates alternative feasible farm 
plans into two sets. Those that are on the EV frontier are said to be "risk efficient" and 
are members of the risk efficient set. Those that are feasible but are not on the frontier 
are said to be inefficient. For any given level of expected income (E(Y)), a plan which 
is on the frontier is said to dominate plans that are not on the frontier. 
The theory of stochastic dominance provides several additional risk efficiency 
criteria. These criteria include First Degree Stochastic Dominance (FSD), Second 
Degree Stochastic Dominance (SSD), and Stochastic Dominance with respect to a 
Function (SDRF). 
First Degree Stochastic Dominance 
Under FSD, a farm plan with an outcome distribution defined by cumulative 
distribution function F(Y) is preferred to an alternative plan with cumulative distribution 
function G(Y) if 
F(Y) < G(Y) [3.8] 
for all possible values of Y and if the inequality is strict for some value of Y. FSD is 
the least restrictive of the SD criteria. FSD is an appropriate criteria for decision makers 
who have positive marginal utility of income and prefer more income to less income. 
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Second Degree Stochastic Dominance 
Under SSD, an alternative with the cumulative distribution F(Y) is preferred to 
a second alternative with cumulative distribution function G(Y) if 
y y 
J F(Y) dy 
-a, 
< J G(Y) dy 
-a, 
[3.9] 
for all possible values of Y, and if the inequality is strict for some value of Y. SSD is 
appropriate for decision makers whose utility functions have positive, nonincreasing 
slopes at all outcome levels. 
Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function 
For narrowing the efficient set beyond FSD and SSD, stochastic dominance with 
respect to a function (SDRF) offers the most discrimination and flexibility (King and 
Robison). SDRF orders uncertain choices for decision makers whose absolute risk 
aversion functions lie within specified upper and lower bounds r1(Y) and r2(Y). The 
interval can be as wide or as narrow as desired where intervals of - oo and + oo would 
yield the same ordering as FSD and interval of O and + oo would yield the same ordering 
as SSD. 
The solution procedure requires the identification of a utility function U(Y), which 
minimizes: 
a, 








Expression [3.10] accounts for the differences between the expected utilities of 
F(Y) and G(Y). If, for the decision makers defined by the absolute risk aversion bonds, 
the minimum of the difference is positive, then F(Y) is preferred to G(Y). This implies 
that the expected utility of F(Y) is always greater than that of G(Y). If the minimum is 
zero, the alternatives can not be ranked. If the minimum is negative, the solution 
requires the identification of the utility function which minimizes 
OD I [F(Y) - G(Y)] U 1 (Y)dy 
-ao 
[3.12] 
subject to the same constraint in equation [3.11]. 
Using stochastic dominance with respect to a function does not guarantee a 
complete ordering because the minimum of both [3 .1 O] and [3 .12] can be negative, which 
implies that neither distribution is unanimously preferred by the relevant group of 
decision makers. 
Stochastic dominance analysis is also useful for approximating the value of 
information. Mjelde and Cochran show that a producer's willingness to pay a premium 
for information equals the amount which can be charged in each state of nature before 
the producer is indifferent between buying and not buying the information. Two 
cumulative distribution functions (cdt) are generated; one cdf (F(Y)) uses decisions 
obtained while utilizing the information; the other cdf (G(Y)) users decisions obtained 
without utilizing the information. The lower bound on the information is the minimum 
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value of the premium, 1r, such that F(Y - 1r) no longer dominates G(Y). The upper 
bound on the information is the minimum premium such that G(Y) dominates F(Y - 'A"). 
Mathematically, the lower bound is given by: Min 'A" such that EU(F(Y - 'A")) - EU(G(Y)) 
< 0 for at least one U in u, where E is the expectation operator and u is the admissible 
class of utility functions. The upper bound differs in that the strict inequality holds for 
all decision maker defined by u. 
A risk efficiency criterion is not sufficient to fully answer the practical 
question of how farm resources should be allocated among competing crop and livestock 
activities to maximize the expected utility of the farmer. This limitation of risk 
efficiency criteria as a practical decision rule can be alleviated to some extent through 
the use of risk programming. 
Risk Programming 
Risk programming is a technique which can be used to identify risk efficient farm 
plans for several of the risk efficiency criterion, given the potential alternative farm 
activities and the resource constraints. It is a technical procedure which can be used to 
evaluate an infinite number of possible combinations of different levels of alternative 
enterprises to find the best feasible enterprise level combination that maximizes the 
expected utility for alternative assumptions regarding risk preferences. 
Risk programming techniques are useful even if the specific utility function is not 
known. In this case, a set of solutions in terms of combination of specific activity levels 
for different levels of income can often be generated. The set of solutions, shows the 
optimal mix of activity levels to minimize risk, expressed in terms of one of the risk 
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efficiency criteria. Therefore, each individual decision maker with resource constraints 
and production alternatives included in the programming model, but with different utility 
functions, can maximize his or her own expected utility by choosing one of the solutions 
in the risk efficient set. 
This technique was first used when a quadratic programming (QP) model was 
constructed and solved to minimize portfolio variance for alternative levels of expected 
return (Markowitz). A QP model was also the first risk programming model applied to 
the agricultural sector (Freund). QP has served as the major risk programming model, 
used for the analysis of risk associated with agricultural production. It has also been 
used for decision making in agricultural credit marketing and long-term investment. 
A quadratic risk programming model incorporates the EV risk efficiency criteria 
to the optimization of alternative activity levels. This method is consistent with the 
expected utility framework in that the objective function, which is expressed in terms of 
expected income and variance of income, corresponds to a quadratic utility function 
(Mapp et al., 1979). 
Another widely used risk programming model is minimization of total absolute 
deviations {MOTAD) as deveioped by Hazell. Originally MOTAD was presented as a 
substitute to QP for researchers who did not have access to a reliable QP solution 
algorithm (Hazell, 1982). 
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Methods for Selecting Risk Efficient Whole-Farm Plan 
In risk programming models it is important to identify the key elements of risk 
to be studied. The major sources of risk and uncertainty are as follows: 
a) uncertainties in activity costs, yield and prices (objective function risk); 
b) change in production technology (technical coefficient risk); and 
c) uncertainties in the availability of resources (right hand side risk). 
Farm prices and yields are major sources of risk that affect the objective function. 
Most risk programming models are constructed to evaluate objective function coefficient 
uncertainty. In many studies, prices and. yield risk are combined to consider variability 
in gross margins for individual crop and livestock enterprises. QP is the most common 
risk programming method. 
Quadratic Programming 
The general formulation of a QP model as developed by Freund is as follows: 







where X is a vector of activity levels, U is vector of expected returns, B is a vector of 
resource constraints, u is a variance covariance matrix, and <I> is a risk aversion 
coefficient. 
An alternative form of QP model reported by Hazell and Norton (1986) is: 
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The major difference between these two formulations is the specification of q, and 
A. The advantage of using Freund's formulation is that it directly specifies the risk 
aversion parameter associated with each point on the frontier (Boisvert and McCarl). 
QP is appropriate for risk averse or risk neutral decision makers whose utility is 
a function of expected income and associated income variance (Hazell, 1971). The risk 
efficient EV frontier can be traced by parameterizing A. By definition, farm plans, or 
portfolios, on the frontier have the minimum variance among all possible plans with the 
same level of expected income. 
Segment OB in Figure 4 describes the EV efficient frontier. The other three 
curves in Figure 4 denote hypothetical iso-utility curves denoting the farmer's preference 
between risk and income. Given the curves, point A in Figure 4 depicts the point of 
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Figure 4. The Optimal E-V Farm Plan. 
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utility maximization. The farm plan that is associated with point A is the optimal farm 
plan. Hence, if the decision maker's EV utility function is known, an optimal farm plan 
can be identified on the frontier. 
In the past, due to limited access to QP computer software, computational 
difficulties, and doubts about the performance of the available packages, applications of 
QP were limited. Early algorithms tended to suffer from rounding errors, and any two 
solution packages seldom performed the same (Hazell, 1971; McCarl and Tice). 
However, with the development of new powerful microcomputers and nonlinear 
optimization routines, these problems have become less important. 
MOTAD 
MOTAD is a linear programming alternative to QP. The objective function for 
MOTAD is to minimize the sum of the absolute deviation of income from a specified 
level of expected income. The mean-ab~olute deviation (EA) risk efficiency frontier can 
be derived by parameterizing the expected income. Moreover, a good approximation of 
the QP derived EV frontier can be derived from the MOT AD solutions by use of the 
Fisher constant that relates sample MAD to population variance (Hazell and Norton). 
If the gross margins from the various production alternatives are normally 
distributed, farm plans that minimize the total absolute deviation are equivalent to those 
that minimize variance. In other words, assumptions and restrictions associated with QP 
or EV analysis apply to EA analysis. 
Since the minimization of total absolute deviation is equivalent to the minimization 
of either the positive or negative deviations, researchers typically set up the model to 
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minimize one or the other. The MOTAD problem formulated by Hazell is presented as 
follows: 
n 
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for all h, h = 1, ... , s 
for all i, i = 1, ... , m 
Chj = gross margin for observation h of activity j 
gj = average gross margin for activity j 
Xj = level of activity j 
Fj = expected net revenue for activity j 
X. = income level 
~j = technical coefficient 







This model was considered a linear approximation of QP with cost and 
computational advantages. But, it is argued that the validity of MOT AD depends on how 
well it approximates expected utility solutions rather than how closely it approximates 
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QP solutions (Johnson and Boehlje). Even if the estimate of variance of income is 
incorrect for each farm plan due to the fact that sample MAD is a less efficient estimator 
of population variance, it is still possible to correctly identify the plan with the smallest 
value of variance for each alternative level of income. Moreover, it is also argued that 
the MAD may sometimes out-perform the sample variance when outcome distributions 
are skewed (Thomson and Hazell). 
Target MOTAD 
Tauer developed Target MOT AD. It provides solutions which are members of 
the SSD efficient set. The Target MOTAD model would be appropriate decision makers 
who seek to maximize expected returns subject to the constraint that returns not fall 
below a critical target level. In Target MOTAD, expected returns are maximized with 
a restriction on the level of negative deviations from the target. Mathematically, the 
model is: 
n 
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k = 1, .... , m [3.27] 
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X. = M, .... , 0 [3.29] 
[3.30] 
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where E(z) is expected return of the plan or solution; Fj is the expected return of activity 
j; Xj is the level of activity j; clicj is the technical requirement of activity j for resource or 
constraint k; bt is the level of resource or constraint k; T is the target level of return; Crj 
is the return of activity j for state of nature or observation r; Yr is the deviation below 
T for state of nature or observation r; Pr is the probability that state of nature or 
observation r will occur; A is a constant parameterized from M to O; m is the number of 
constraint and resource equations; s is the number of states of nature or observations; and 
M is a large number. 
Since deviations are not measured from the mean, as is the case with MOTAD, 
total negative deviations below the target do not as a rule equal total negative deviations. 
Using a target, this framework standardizes the risk reference point across all activities 
considered, (while in MOTAD the risk reference point is equal to and moves with the 
mean). Further, Watts et al. observe that " ... Target MOTAD will never choose a 
dominated plan, regardless of the target selected. . . " (Watts et al. p. 179). Target 
MOTAD treats risk as negative deviations from a target level. It offers considerable 
advantages for examining risk-return tradeoffs in the context of whole farm planning, 
compared to MOTAD which treats both negative and positive deviations as a source of 
risk. Even though it seems logical to penalize negative returns as a source of risk, it 
does not seem to be rational to view positive deviation as a source of risk. Moreover, 
Target MOTAD has no restrictive distributional assumptions made in its formulation. 
Therefore, the Target MOTAD framework is applicable to cases where income 
distributions are not normal. This, together with the fact that all Target MOTAD 
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solutions are efficient by the SSD criterion, explains why the Target MOT AD method 
has emerged as a common tool for evaluation of risky alternative production strategies. 
Some Applications of Target MOTAD 
Pederson and Bertelsen used Target MOTAD and simulation methods to analyze 
the opportunity to reduce whole-farm risk in a diversified cash farm crop. Forty possible 
activities were specified in the model. Results showed that risk reduction was achieved 
through traditional enterprise diversification. Risk-efficient strategies derived from the 
Target MOTAD model were simulated. to monitor farm financial performance. 
Novak et al. applied Target MOTAD to assess the risks and returns of several 
cropping systems including a sustainable cotton rotation. The Universal Soil Loss 
Equation (USLE) was used to calculate potential annual soil losses from sheet and rill 
erosion under the six cropping systems. Ten years of data were used to analyze the 
profitability of six rotations. Risk-returns for soil losses of three tons/acre/year were 
analyzed using Target MOTAD model. The results indicated that diversification in 
rotations resulted in the least risk for a given level of target income. 
Misra and Spurlock developed a Target MOTAD model to analyze intra-year 
impacts on profit due to the variations in timing of planting and harvesting as well as to 
capture inter-year impacts on profit that arise from fluctuations in weather and economic 
factors. Delays in field work may occur due to unfavorable weather or due to the limited 
capacity of the planting or harvesting equipment. The loss in profit due to less timeliness 
is considered in the model. Even though earliness showed significant benefits, a 
combination of maturity management practices performed better than a single practice. 
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Paxton, Vandeveer, and Lavergne evaluated the potential benefits of irrigation 
with the aid of a Target MOTAD model. They used subjective yield expectations data 
for developing enterprise gross margin series. Yield estimates for both dryland and 
irrigated conditions were obtained from farmers by a direct interview. The target income 
used in the model was an expected income level that allowed the farm to meet all of its 
financial obligations. Results showed that irrigation offers substantial potential to 
increase farm income and to reduce relative risk. 
In this chapter, the conceptual framework and methods for selecting risk efficient 
whole-farm plans were examined. The concept of expected utility as related to whole-
farm planning were explored. Hazell's MOTAD formulation developed as an alternative 
QP, was described and critiqued. The theoretical validity of the MOTAD formulation 
was examined, when the critical assumption of normality is violated. The Target 
MOTAD approach was also described. It is considered to have a more robust theoretical 
foundation for modelling risk in the context of whole-farm planning than either QP or 
MOTAD. 
CHAPTERN 
THE MODEL AND DATA DEVELOPMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the various data sources and methods 
used to obtain the information necessary for the construction of a representative farm 
model. This chapter begins with a description of the hypothetical farm which is designed 
to represent a typical Garfield County, Oklahoma winter wheat and stocker cattle farm. 
This is followed by a description of the agronomic study of alternative wheat tillage 
systems from which the wheat grain yield data used for the analysis were derived. The 
methods used to obtain machinery complements, stocker cattle production coefficients, 
and wheat and stocker cattle prices over time are described. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the method used to obtain the data necessary to incorporate the federal 
wheat commodity program into the risk programming model. 
The Representative Farm 
Information from the 1987 agriculture census, pertaining to Garfield County is 
presented in Table 2. The representative farm used in this analysis consists of 600 acres 
of cropland, reflecting the average farm size in Garfield County of 536 acres (Table 2). 
The federal government commodity program wheat base acreage is 570 acres. The total 
wheat acreage base for Garfield County is 95 percent of the total cropland. 
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Table 2. Farms, Land in Farms, and Cropland in Garfield County, 1987. 
Number of Farms 
Land in Farms (Acres) 
Total Cropland (Acres) 
Average Farm Size (Acres) 







The set of potential production activities for the representative farm includes 
wheat for grain, wheat for winter grazing stocker steers and grain, and wheat exclusively 
for grazing stocker steers. Wheat can be produced on the farm with any of seven tillage 
systems. The model also includes activities which are necessary to evaluate the 
economics of participation in the wheat commodity program. 
Available family labor is assumed to be equivalent to one full time person. The 
total amount of labor hours by month that the operator devotes to farm production 
practices are calculated by assuming that eight hours are available for work per day from 
March to October and 10 hours per day during the rest of the year. 
The hours available to conduct field work each month were computed based upon 
estimates provided for the region by Kletke and Sestak. These estimates are based upon 
historical weather data and observations regarding the amount of time necessary for a 
field to dry after a rain prior to field operations. A timeliness level of 85 percent was 
assumed which means a machinery complement must be assembled such that the farm 
operator can perform the required field operations in the correct time period in 17 of 20 
years (Kletke and Sestak). The calculated field work time hours per month for the 
representative farm are contained in Table 3. 
Agronomic Study of Wheat Response to Tillage 
The experiment station study was conducted for ten consecutive years (1977-1986) 
on a Grant silt loam soil (Udic Arguistolls) at the North Central Research Station near 
Lahoma, Oklahoma. Five tillage systems plus one no-till system were evaluated using 
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Table 3. Hours Per Month Assumed to be Available for Field Work on the 
Representative Farm. 
Month Days/Month Hours/Day Hours/Month 
January 23.75 8 190 
February 23.00 8 184 
March 24.00 8 192 
April 19.25 10 193 
May 17.50 10 175 
June 20.25 10 203 
July 23.25 10 233 
August 23.75 10 238 
September 21.00 10 210 
October 20.75 8 166 
November 22.50 8 180 
December 23.75 8 190 
Source: Kletke and Sestak. 
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24 by 40 feet plots in a randomized complete block design with four replications. The 
six treatments were repeated on the same plots for ten years. During the course of the 
study the station received an average of 28 inches of annual rainfall. 
The five tillage methods differed in terms of primary, secondary, and tertiary 
tillage operations. In most years, primary tillage was conducted in July and secondary 
tillage in August. Timing of tillage operations was adjusted in response to emergence 
and growth of summer weeds, and in three of the ten years the secondary tillage 
operations were conducted twice. Field operations conducted for each of the six systems 
are described in Table 4. Tillage implements used in the study are described in Table 
5. 
The Chisel and Sweep systems represent two types of stubble-mulching (Runyan; 
Zingg and Whitfield). Primary tillage for the Chisel system was conducted with 14 inch 
sweeps operated at a depth of 2 to 3 inches. The Chisel system should not be confused 
with chisel plowing with twisted shanks or chisel spikes which would generally be 
conducted to a depth of 6 to 9 inches. Tillage operations for the Sweep system consisted 
of three or four passes with a single 8 foot blade operated at a depth of 3 inches. 
Precise measurements· of surface residue remaining at seeding were not taken. 
However, two of the systems, the Plow-23cm (moldboard plow operated at a depth of 
9 inches) and Plow-15cm (moldboard plow operated at a depth of 6 inches), used a 
moldboard plow for the primary tillage operation and left essentially no residue from the 
previous wheat crop on the soil surface at planting. At the other extreme, the only soil 
disturbance for the no-till system occurred when the plots were seeded. The remaining 
three systems were intermediate in terms of surface residue remaining and included the 
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spray (0.3 X) 






"ln three of the ten years two secondary field operations were performed. 
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Table 5. Description of Tillage Implements, Depth of Operation, and Impact on Surface 
Residue. 
Implement Description Surface Residue 
remaining after One 
Pass (%f 
Chisel 14 inch sweeps operated at a depth of 2 to 3 80 
inches 
Disk flexible offset tandem disk operated at a 60 
depth of 3 to 4 inches for primary tillage 
and slightly deeper in secondary and final 
tillage operations 
Plow moldboard plow with scalloped rolling 0-5 
coulters operated at a depth of 9 inches for 
the Plow-23cm system and at a depth of 6 
inches for the Plow-15cm system 
Springtooth springtooth. harrow with a spiketooth harrow 95 
attachment with two rows of spikes 
Sweep single 8 foot Noble blade with a single gang 90 
mulch treader attached operated at a depth 
of 3 inches 
• Estimate from prior studies (Johnston and Stiegler). 
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Disk, Chisel, and Sweep systems. Based upon prior research, the Disk system would 
be expected to maintain 19 percent of the previous crop's residue on the surface at 
planting time. · The narrow 14 inch sweeps of the Chisel system would be expected to 
incorporate 46 percent of the residue and maintain 54 percent on the surface. Three 
passes of the 8 foot wide sweep of the sweep system would be expected to result in a 
seedbed which maintained 70 percent of the previous crop's residue on the surface 
(Johnston and Stiegler). 
Two applications of glyphosate at a rate of 2 pints/acre were used for weed 
control in the summer for the No-till system. In three of the ten years, in which summer 
rainfall was above average, three applications of glyphosate were used. Glyphosate was 
applied with a compressed air plot sprayer with a carrier volume of 30 gallons/acre. No 
additional herbicide was used on the No-till plots, and no herbicides were used on the 
other five treatments. 
Glyphosate was applied to control plant growth during the time between harvest 
in June and no-till drilling in the fall. Herbicide technology has advanced since the study 
was designed in 1976. If the study were initiated today, a lower rate of glyphosate, or 
some other herbicide or combination of herbici~es would be used. During the course of 
the 10 year study an average of 4.6 pints/acre of glyphosate were applied per year on the 
no-till plots. At current prices this is $27 /acre. This value is included on the No-till 
budget. 
Use of herbicides to control weeds throughout the entire summer, in a region 
which receives 28 inches of annual rainfall, is expensive. One no-till continuous wheat 
study conducted in the region in which a combination of herbicides was used reported 
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an annual cost of $43.50/acre for herbicides (Epplin et al.). Because of substantial 
changes in herbicide technology since the study was initiated, a modified no-till activity 
is included in the model. It is based upon the assumption that equivalent weed control 
could be achieved with a different herbicide program. Yields for the modified no-till 
system are assumed to be equal to those obtained with the no-till system used in the 
experiment. 
The hard red winter wheat cultivar Danne was seeded in late September or early 
October, depending upon soil moisture, to each plot in all years at a rate of 60 
pounds/acre. When the study was initiated, a commercial no-till drill was not available 
to the researchers. Initially, an attempt was made to use a standard hoe drill with spear-
point openers. However, the surface residue from prior wheat crops would not flow 
freely between the spear-points in the no-till plots, and the spear-points did not form a 
furrow with consistent depth (Runyan). 
A conventional hoe drill with 10 inch row spacing was substantially modified and 
used to seed all plots. Ripple rolling coulters (designed for use on a no-till com planter) 
18 inches in diameter were mounted in front of the spear-point openers to cut residue. 
Two 55 gallon drums filled with concrete were mounted on the drill to provide down 
force essential for the coulters and openers to function. Press wheels 20 inches in 
diameter followed the openers. 
Diammonium phosphate was broadcast at a rate of 100 pounds/acre and 
ammonium nitrate at a rate of 186 pounds/acre to each plot each year. The forage was 
not winter-grazed. Plots were harvested in June of each year with a combine equipped 
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with a straw spreader. The stubble height remaining after harvest ranged from 12 to 18 
inches. 
To reflect changes in technology since the study was designed in 1976, several 
deviations relative to type and level of input use were budgeted. For example, 
ammonium nitrate was the primary source of nitrogen actually used in the experiment. 
It was replaced by 28-0-0 in the No-till and Modified No-till.budgets and by 82-0-0 in 
the budgets for the other production systems. A seeding rate of 1.5 bushels/acre was 
used in the case of grazed wheat and one bushel/acre seeding rate for non-grazed wheat. 
Glyphosate was used as the primary herbicide in the study and is budgeted in the No-till 
budget. However, Landmaster® is used in the modified No-till budget. 
Wheat Yields 
Wheat yields obtained from each treatment for each of the ten years and the 
ten-year average yields are included in Table 6. Data were analyzed separately for each 
year and then combined and analyzed for all ten years (Epplin et al.). In eight of the ten 
years, yields were statistically significantly different across the six treatments at a 
probability level of 0.05. The Plow-15cm treatment resulted in statistically significantly 
greater yields than the No-till treatment in seven of the ten years. 
When averaged over the ten years, yields from both plow treatments, Plow-23cm 
and Plow-15cm, were greater than yields of the other four treatments. The mean yield 
for both the Plow-23cm and Plow-15cm treatments was 34 bushels/acre. Average yield 
from the Disk treatment was 31 bushels/acre which was statistically significantly less than 
that obtained from either Plow treatment but greater than that obtained from plots of the 
Table 6. Wheat Yield for Ten Years at Lahoma, Oklahoma from Alternative Production Systems. 
----------------------------Wheat Yields by Year (bushels/ acre)-----------------------------
Treatment 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 ~ean 
Chisel 21.6 24.3 51.0 30.3 26.9 23.2 28.0 29.6 14.9 24.6 27.4 
Plow-23cm 29.4 35.6 48.0 29.9 26.9 40.7 40.2 54.2 14.0 23.3 34.2 
Disc 27.8 31.9 52.3 33.9 23.6 36.2· 30.8 34.1 13.5 22.1 30.6 
Plow-15cm 34.0. 38.2 50.2 35.4 23.9 36.6 32.3 46.5 14.3 . 30.1 34.2 
Sweep 20.1 23.0 48.5 24.8 22.7 20.9 22.5 32.3 13.2 23.2 25.1 




Chisel treatment (27 bushels/acre). Yields from the Chisel treatment exceeded those of 
the Sweep and No-till treatments. The lowest mean yield of 24 bushels/acre was 
obtained from the No-till treatment. Over time, cheat (Bromus secalinus L.) became a 
serious weed problem in the No-till and Sweep plots. Relative yield results are consistent 
with those reported by others for the more humid regions of the Great Plains (Bauer and 
Black; Daniel et al.; Davidson and Santelmann; Harper; Heer and Krenzer). 
Measurements of surface residue at planting were not recorded. However, based 
upon prior research of the effects of tillage operations on residue, the average wheat 
grain yields obtained from the six treatments were inversely related to the amount of 
residue from the previous wheat crop retained on the surface at planting. That is, the 
highest yields were obtained from tillage systems which incorporated all residue of the 
previous crop, and the lowest yields were obtained from treatments which maintained the 
largest percentage of residue on the surface. 
In general, yields obtained from experiment station trials are preferred over 
county and state average yields for farm level analysis because the variability on an 
experiment station is more likely to approximate the variability experienced by 
individuals who farm in the vicinity of the station. Data from the agronomic study and 
county and state average yields were fitted with ordinary least squares to verify 
differences in variability and to test for trends in wheat grain yields. The results, which 
are reported in Table 7, show that the experiment station yields were indeed more 
variable than county and state average yields. No significant trends in average yields 
were present in either the experiment station or the county or state averages. Hence, it 
is not necessary to detrend the grain yields for the programming model. 
Table 7. Linear Trend Analysis of Wheat Yields.• 
Yield Standard Deviation 
A 
~l 
R2 Mean f3o 
Average yields obtained 29.31 9.58 35.27 -1.08 .12 
in experiment (1977-1986) (-l.03t 
Garfield County average yields: 
1977-1986 35.48 4.54 36.45 -.177 .01 
(-.37) 
1982-1991 34.16 5.50 38.03 -.884 .24 
(-1.58) 
1977-1991 34.57 5.08 37.36 -.35 .09 
(-1.16) 
Oklahoma State 31.20 4.05 29.53 .303 .05 
Average yields 1977-1986 (.66) 
Source: Agricultural Statistics, Oklahoma Department of Agriculture. 
a The regression equation is Y = ~0 + ~ 1 X, where Y is wheat yield in bushels per acre and Xis year with 1977 or 1982 equal 
1. 
b Values in parentheses are estimated student t-values. All computed t-values are smaller than the critical t-value of 2.306 at the 5 




Preparation of Machinery Complements 
A machinery selection model developed by Kletke and Sestak was used to prepare 
machinery complements for a farm of 600 acres for each of the seven systems. The 
machinery complements contain only those implements required to complete the tillage 
and seeding operations for the farm with the assumption that the entire farm is seeded 
each year to winter wheat. For example, the Plow-23cm complement includes a tractor, 
moldboard plow, disk, springtooth, and conventional grain drill. The machinery 
complements do not include a combine or grain truck since most of the wheat produced 
in Oklahoma is harvested and hauled by custom operators. Custom harvesting costs are 
included directly in the enterprise budgets -which are reported in Tables 8 and 9. 
Complements for the No-till and Modified No-till systems are identical. 
Annual machinery ownership (depreciation, insurance, taxes, and interest) and 
operating costs (fuel, oil, lubricants, repairs, and labor) were computed for the 600 acre 
farm and converted to a per acre basis. Results are summarized in Tables 8 and 9. The 
machinery labor requirements by month for the 600 acre wheat farm for each of the 
seven tillage systems are reported in Table 10. 
Stocker Steer Production on Winter Wheat 
In the southern Great Plains, including Oklahoma, hard red winter wheat is grown 
for two purposes -- to produce wheat for grain and to produce forage for cattle. Stocker 
cattle may be grazed on winter wheat from November through February and the grain 
crop may be harvested in June. If the stocker cattle· are permitted to graze the wheat 
Table 8. Enterprise Budgets for Grain Only Wheat Production for Seven Tillage Systems With 1991 Prices. 
Cbioel Plow-23cm Diak Plow-15cm Sweep No-till Modifiod No-till 
Itan. Units Prico Quanti!l Valm Quanti!l Valuo Qumti!l Valm Quonli!l Valuo Quonlily Valm Quonli!}: Valuo Quanti!l Valui, 
b,elpt 
Whoo! bu. S 2.85 'J:l.«f 18.119 34.211 '¥7.47 30.60 87.21 34.20 '¥7.47 25.10 71.54 24.30 69.2' 24.30 69.26 
Tdal b,elpta 18.119 '¥7.47 87.21 '¥7.47 71.54 SI.SI C!0.51 
Openlion Inputs 
Wboat Seod bu. S 5.00 1 5.00 l 5.00 l 5.00 l 5.00 l 5.00 l 5.00 1.5 7.50 
18-46-0 -· $12.00 l 12.00 l 12.00 l 12.00 l 12.00 1 12.00 I 12.00 I 12.00 ~ Ammonia (82,0,0) -- $9.00 0.63 5.67 0.63 5.61 0.63 5.61 0.63 5.67 0.63 5.67 0 . 0.00 0 0.00 
Fellilizer Application ·- s 2.50 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.50 I 2.50 
28-0-0 -· SUS 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.86 12.74 1.86 12.74 LmlMuter .. $0.15 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 132 19.IIO 
G~ pml S 5.85 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 4.66 'rl.2' 0 0.00 
Machinoty ubcn- hn. $6.00 0.82 4.92 0.91 5.46 0.58 3.48 0.79 4.74 0.56 3.36 0.36 2.16 0.44 2.64 
Fuel Lubo .... Rq,alr - 8.69 10.30 6.16 8.C!O 5.42 4.60 5.53 
Ammal Opentina Capital s $0.119 'J:l.21 2.45 28.82 2..S9 24.23 2.18 'J:l.01 2.43 23.59 2.12 49.'lO 4.47 45.16 4.D6 
Cultcm ilan...t & Haul 
lluoChaqo - $12.00 l 12.IIO. I 12.00 I 12.00 I 12.00 I 12.00 I 12.00 I 12.00 
F.xeooa for > • 31 bu. $0.12 7.<111 0.89 14.20 l.'lll 10.60 l.'J:I 14.20 l.'lO 5.10 0.61 4.30 0.52 4.30 0.52 
Haullna bu. $0.12 'J:l.40 3.29 34.20 4.10 30.60 3.61 34.20 4.10 25.10 3.01 24.30 2.92 24.30 2.92 
Tdal Openllna COit SI- 54.91 58.83 51.43 56.25 44.31 86.17 79.'lO 
Machinoty Fmd COit SI- 17.57 21.65 19.18 21.65 15.57 14.96 14.96 
Tdal Openllna & Fmcl C..t SI- 72.47 80.48 71.21 77.'XJ 64.77 91.00 !M.80 
Rdum to land, labor, Slacro 5.62 16.9!1 16.00 19.57 6.77 -21.75 -25.54 
.,...moad., riok ............ -
• A- ylo]d obtainod ill lhD lal ,- exporimonl. 
°' -
Table 9. Enterprise Budgets for Grain and Grazing Wheat Production for Seven Tillage Systems With 1991 Prices. 
Cblael Plaw-23cm Dill< Plow-15cm haop No-till Modiliod No-till 
11ml Units Prioo <1mmi!l Value <1mmi!l Value <1mmi!l Value Quanti!l Valuo <1mmi!l Value <1mmi!l Value Qimmity Va!m 
Reooipt Sourc,ce 
Wboat bu. S 2.8S '1:1.«r 78.119 34.211 'TT.41 30.ffl 87.21 34.211 'TT.47 2S.10 71.S4 24.30 69.26 24.30 69.26 
Towa-ipta 78.119 'TT.41 87.20 'TT.47 71.S4 69.26 69.26 
Opemtlon Inputs 
Wboat Seed bu. S S.00 I.S 7.SO I.S 7.50 I.S 7.50 I.S 7.50 I.S 7.SO l.S 7.50 l.S 7.50 
18-46-0 """· Sl2.00 1 12.00 I 12.00 I 12.00 1 12.00 1 12.00 1 12.00 1 12.00 
~ Ammonia (82-0-0) """· S 9.00 1.12 10.08 1.12 10.08 1.12 10.08 1.12 10.08 1.12 10.08 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Fertilimr Applicatlcn - S2.SO 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 I 2.50 I 2.50 
211-0e """· S 6.8S 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 3.29 22.S4 3.29 22.S4 
Lad Mu1et ... SO.IS 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 132 19.80 
GJwbooate pint S S.8S 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 4.66 '1:1.26 0 0.00 
Macbino,y Labor 11111. S 6.00 0.82 4.92 0.91 S.46 O.S8 3.48 0.'19 4.74 O.S6 3.36 0.36 2.16 0.44 2.64 
FuoI Luhe om Rq,olr IICllO 8.69 10.30 6.16 8.ffl S.42 4.ffl S.S3 
Ammo! Opentinc Capital s S 0.09 32.39 2.92 34.01 3.86 29.42 2.90 28.77 2.59 47.76 4.30 S8.'2 S.30 S4.38 4.89 
C..tcm Harwet ,. Haul 
BaoChaqe - Sl2.00 1 12.00 I 12.00 1 12.00 I 12.00 1 12.00 1 12.00 1 12.00 
e.i- for > - 211 bu. $0.12 7.40 0.89 14.211 1.10 JO.SI 1.27 14.20 1.10 S.10 0.61 4.30 O.S2 4.30 O.S2 
Haulin& bu. S 0.12 '1:7.40 3.29 34.211 4.10 30.60 3.67 34.20 4.10 2S.10 3.01 24.30 2.92 24.30 2.92 
Tow Opentina Colt $/IICllO 62.28 66.21 S8.81 63.63 S6.S7 99.29 92.84 
Macbino,y Flxal Colt $/acm 17.57 21.6S 19.78 21.6S IS.S7 14.96 14.96 
Tow Opentina Ii: Flxal Colt $/acte '19.85 87.86 78.S9 8S.28 72.14 114.2S 107.80 
Rdum. to 1ml, lamr, $/acm -1.78 9.61 8.62 12.19 -0.6!1 -44.99 -38.S4 
overlad1 risk and IDIIIIIS!'!"!P! 
• A- ylold obtainod in tm tm yair axperimont. 
~ 
Table 10. The Machinery Labor Requirements for the Representative Wheat Farm for Each of the Alternative Tillage Systems. 







July 132.51 211.05 70.87 140.64 64.83 41.25 41.25 
August 251.83 169.86 169.86 169.86 161.83 12.38 12.38 






beyond the jointing stage of the wheat plants (typically the middle of March) grain yield 
will be reduced. 
Stocker steer activities on winter wheat and stocker steers on wheat for grazeout 
are included as potential activities for the representative farm. It is assumed that wheat 
yield is not affected by winter grazing from November to the middle of March. 
However, for the grazeout activity, in which grazing is extended from the first of March 
to the first of May, the entire grain crop is sacrificed. The model will include three 
alternatives for stocker steers: winter grazing, winter grazing and grazeout, and 
grazeout. 
Walker et al. reported that most wheat pasture stocker cattle for North Central 
Oklahoma are purchased between October 1 and October 15. They also reported that on 
average 73 percent of the wheat stockers are placed on the wheat between November 1 
and November 18. More than 70 percent of the stockers purchased to graze wheat weigh 
between 351 and 500 pounds (Walker et al.). The production coefficients used in the 
model are based upon estimates included in enterprise budgets prepared by Teague et al. 
Time series information regarding the impact of weather and climate on yield 
(weight gain) of stocker steers on wheat is not available for the region. Hence, for the 
purposes of this study, the technical parameters are assumed to be deterministic (fixed). 
Assumptions regarding technical parameters are as follows: 
Winter Grazing: purchase steers at 450 pounds on October 15; 2 percent death 
loss; 3 percent shrink; 2 pounds average net gain per day; 0.5 head per acre stocking 
rate; placed on winter wheat pasture for 135 days; removed and sold on March 1 at 
weight of 690 pounds (Teague et al.). 
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Winter Grazing and Grazeout: purchase at 450 pounds on October 15; 2 percent 
death loss; 3 percent shrink; 2.1 pound average net gain per day; 0.5 head per acre 
stocking rate during winter grazing months (November through February); 1 head per 
acre stocking rate during grazeout months (March to May l); placed on wheat pasture 
for 195 days; removed and sold on May 1 at weight of 825 pounds (Teague et al.). 
For both the winter grazing and winter grazing and grazeout activities it is 
assumed that the animals require two weeks of supplemental feeding and conditioning, 
from October 15 to November 1, prior to placement in the wheat field. It is assumed 
that all animals are purchased in October. Animals for the winter grazing and grazeout 
activity are simply "carried over" into the grazeout months. The third livestock 
production activity is for animals that are purchased in the Spring for grazeout. 
Technical parameters for this activity are as follows: 
Grazeout: purchase at 690 pounds on March 1; no death loss; . 3 percent shrink; 
2.68 pound average net gain per day; 1 head per acre stocking rate; placed on wheat 
fields for 60 days from March 1 to May 1; sold at 825 pounds on May 1. 
Total cost of livestock_production for 1991 excluding the cost of purchasing the 
steer calves and the cost of wheat pasture were obtained from Teague et al. for stocker 
steers on grazing winter wheat and grazeout. These estimates are included in Tables 11 
and 12. The cost for stocker steers on grazeout wheat pasture is assumed to be the same 
as stocker steers on grazing and grazeout excluding the cost of medicines, feed during 
conditioning and forage cost. Moreover, the cost of salt and minerals was computed by 
subtracting the cost on the grazing budget from the cost on the grazing and grazeout 
66 
Table 11. Enterprise Budget for Stocker Steers on Winter Wheat Pasture in North 
Central Oklahoma. 
Operating Inputs Units Price Quantity Value 
Steer Calves cwt $102.75 4.50 $462.38 
*Med. Feed during 
Cond. lbs. 0.12 110.00 13.20 
Wheat Pasture Charge 
Leased Pasture cwt 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Own Pasture 
Owned Land cwt 3.60 4.50 16.19 
Rented Land cwt 7.65 4.50 34.43 
Grain Sorghum Stalks Pasture Charge 
Leased Pasture hd 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Own Pasture 
Owned Land hd 0.90 1.00 0.90 
Rented Land hd 1.95 1.00 1.95 
*Forage lbs 0.02 400.00 8.65 
*Salt & Minerals lbs 0.22 15.75 3.47 
*Hedging Charge cwt 1.00 7.11 7.11 
*Vet Services hd 9.00 1.00 9.00 
*Vet-Med-Ls Supp. hd' 2.08 1.00 2.08 
*Hired Livestock 
labor hr 5.50 0.11 0.60 
Machinery & Equipment 
*Fuel & Lube dol 5.51 
*Repairs dol 3.66 
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS $569.19 
Fixed Costs Units Value 
Machinery 
*Depreciation dol 11.47 
*Taxes dol 0.32 
*Insurance dol 0.12 
Equipment 
*Depreciation dol 3.37 
*Taxes dol 0.25 
*Insurance dol 0.15 
TOTAL FIXED COSTS $15.69 
Production 
Days held on 
pasture 135 
Death Loss 0.02 
Shrink 0.03 
Gain/Day 2.00 
Ending Weight 7.11 
Steers cwt 90.47 6.90 $623.94 
Residual Above Total Variable Costs, Per Head $54.76 
Residual Above Total Variable and Fixed Costs, Per Head $39.07 
Source: Adapted from Teague, ct.al. 
• Cost of items with astcrisb arc IIUIIIIIICd to obtained the gross cost of the activity for the programming models. 
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Table 12. Enterprise Budget for Stocker Steers on Grazeout Wheat Pasture in North 
Central Oklahoma. 
Operating Inputs Units Price Quantity Value 
Steer Calves (400-500) cwt $102.75 4.50 $462.38 
*Med. Feed during 
Cond. lbs. 0.12 110.00 13.20 
Wheat Pasture Charge, Grazeout Wheat Portion 
Leased Pasture cwt 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Own Pasture 
Owned Land cwt 1.60 6.00 9.57 
Rented Land cwt 3.40 6.00 20.43 
Grain Sorghum Stalks Pasture Charge, Winter Wheat Portion (incl.G.S. Stalks) 
Leased Pasture cwt 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Own Pasture 
Owned Land cwt 3.79 4.50 17.05 
Rented Land cwt 8.09 4.50 36.42 
*Forage lbs 0.02 400.00 8.65 
*Salt & Minerals lbs 0.22 22.75 5.01 
*Hedging Charge cwt 1.00 8.51 8.51 
*Vet Services hd 9.00 1.00 9.00 
*Vet-Med-Ls Supp. hd 2.08 1.00 2.08 
*Hired Livestock 
labor hr 5.50 0.11 0.60 
Machinery & Equipment 
*Fuel & Lube dol 5.57 
*Repairs dol 3.66 
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS $602.12 
Fixed Costs Units Value 
Machinery 
*Depreciation dol 11.47 
*Taxes dol 0.12 
*Insurance dol 0.32 
Equipment 
*Depreciation dol 3.37 
*Taxes dol 0.25 
*Insurance dol 0.15 
TOTAL FIXED COSTS $15.69 
Production 
Days held on 
pasture 195 
Death Loss 0.02 
Shrink 0.03 
Gain/Day 2.10 
Ending Weight 8.51 
Steers cwt 83.22 8.25 $686.55 
Residual Above Total Variable Costs, Per Head $84.43 
Residual Above Total Variable and Fixed Costs, Per Head $68.74 
Source: Adapted from Teague, et.al. 
• Cost of items with asterisks are summed to obtained lhe gross cost of the activit;y for the programming models. 
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budget. Livestock labor requirements were obtained from the enterprise budgets 
prepared by Walker et al. 
Prices and Costs 
Time series of prices for wheat grain and stocker cattle were used to estimate the 
net returns resulting from each production activity. For the model, 1982-1991 wheat 
grain and stocker prices were used rather than the prices which prevailed over the time 
period of the field experiment (1977-1986). Table 13 includes the mean, standard 
deviation, and coefficient of variation for wheat prices for both time periods. Since there 
is no significant trend in wheat yields (Table 7) and no correlation between average 
yields (Table 14) and prices over the two periods of 1977 to 1986 and 1982 to 1991, the 
more recent prices 1982-1991 were used to conduct the analysis. 
Correlation Between Yields and Prices 
A simple correlation between average wheat yields and wheat prices over the 
period from 1977 to 1986 was calculated to determine if wheat prices and yields were 
correlated over the time period. This test was conducted to justify the use of the more 
recent prices 1982-1991 instead of the 1977-1986 prices which was the period during 
which the experiment was conducted, since in the aggregate, one would expect that prices 
and yields are correlated. The results indicate that over the time period of the study 
wheat prices were not correlated with the average yield obtained from the experiment. 
The null hypothesis of zero correlation could not be rejected at 5 percent level of 
significant (Table 14). 
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Table 13. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation for Average Annual 









Coefficient of Variation 
.188 
.177 










t = <r>M 
J1-r2 
• Not significant at 5 percent level of significance (the computed t-values are smaller than 




The annual operating capital required for each alternative wheat production system 
was calculated and is reported in the budgets. The annual operating capital in 1991 
dollars for each of the livestock activities was calculated to be $179.22, $294.85, and 
$109.70 for stocker steers on grazing, grazing and grazeout, and grazeout wheat pasture, 
respectively. Annual operating capital is the amount of operating capital in "annualized 
units" necessary to conduct the crop or livestock production activity. For example, 
consider that the grazeout activity requires approximately $660 of operating capital for 
two months. That is, $660 must be invested in the enterprise and is not available for 
investment elsewhere. The cost of this amount of capital is equivalent to the cost of 
$110 of capital for one year. Hence, the activity requires $110 of "annual" operating 
capital. Capital is not a constraint in the model. The total annual operating capital 
required for the farm will be determined by the model and is available at a fixed price 
of nine percent per annum in 1991 dollars. 
Derivation of Real Prices 
In most risk programming applications time series prices are adjusted to reflect 
the real rather than nominal value over time. Brink and McCarl used the parity index 
to express all gross margins in constant dollar values to remove the upward trend often 
associated with gross margins per acre over time. Mapp et al. adjusted prices for trend 
where appropriate and expressed returns and costs in constant dollars. They adjusted the 
cost of production for each activity by using the index of prices paid by farmers. 
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Wheat Prices 
Wheat prices used in the model are Oklahoma season average prices. This is 
consistent with the practice used by other researchers (Mikesell et al.; Williams et al.). 
To adjust prices to a 1991 basis, the implicit price deflator for gross domestic product 
was used. The index numbers for 1981 through 1991 were divided into their associated 
1991 index to obtain the adjustment factor (Mcsweeny and Kramer). Table 15 includes 
the implicit price deflator for gross domestic product from 1981 through 1991, as well 
as the corresponding adjustment factors. Nominal and real wheat prices are presented 
in Table 16. 
Livestock Prices 
Livestock prices used in the analysis are based upon monthly average prices which 
prevailed at the Oklahoma City stockyards. Prices reported for 400 to 500 pound steers 
were used to represent the price for 450 pound steers in the model. A similar procedure 
was used to obtain prices for 690 pound steers. The average prices for steers weighing 
between 600 and 700 pounds and steers weighing between 700 and 800 pounds (Table 
17) were adjusted to 1991 prices using the implicit price deflator for gross domestic 
product, 1982 to 1991 (Table 18). 
Gross Margins 
Gross margins for each of the alternative crop and livestock production systems 
are calculated based upon an assumption of nonparticipation in government programs. 
The estimated gross margins for the wheat production activities were calculated by 
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Table 15. Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic Product, 1981-1991. 
Year Index Number Inflation Factor 
1981 78.9 1.49 
1982 83.8 1.41 
1983 87.2 1.35 
1984 91.0 1.29 
1985 94.4 1.25 
1986 96.9 1.22 
1987 100.0 1.18 
1988 103.9 1.13 
1989 108.5 1.09 
1990 113.2 1.04 
1991 117.8 1.00 
Source: Economic Report of the President Transmitted to Congress, Washington: 
G.P.0., January, 1983. 
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Source: Agricultural Statistics, Oklahoma Department of Agriculture. 
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Table 17. Livestock Prices at the Oklahoma City Stockyards in Nominal Dollars, 
1981-1991. 
Buy Sell 
October March• March• May 
600-700 and 600-700 and 
Year 400-500 lbs 700-800 lbs. 700-800 lbs. 700-800 lbs. 
($/cwt) ($/cwt) ($/cwt) ($/cwt) 
1981 65.40 b b b 
1982 67.95 70.50 70.50 63.71 
1983 66.89 67.40 67.40 61.01 
1984 71.61 67.40 67.40 63.08 
1985 71.94 59.94 59.94 53.12 
1986 93.38 70.35 70.35 69.85 
1987 100.55 83.55 83.55 79.90 
1988 100.71 83.31 83.31 76.76 
1989 104.25 85.00 85.00 86.80 
1990 104.63 92.63 92.63 89.66 
1991 b 82.30 82.30 79.06 
Mean 85.76 75.18 75.18 71.68 
• The average value of the two series (the buying and selling weight is 690 lbs). 
b Observations not needed for analysis. 
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Table 18. Livestock Prices at the Oklahoma City Stockyards in 1991 Dollars, 1981-
1991. 
Buy Sell 
October March• March• May 
600-700 and 600-700 and 
Year 400-500 lbs 700-800 lbs. 700-800 lbs. 700-800 lbs. 
($/cwt) ($/cwt) ($/cwt) ($/cwt) 
1981 97.45 b b b 
1982 95.81 99.41 99.41 89.83 
1983 90.30 90.99 90.99 82.36 
1984 93.09 87.62 87.62 82.00 
1985 89.93 74.93 74.93 66.90 
1986 113.92 85.83 85.83 85.22 
1987 118.65 98.59 98.59 94.28 
1988 113.80 94.14 94.14 86.74 
1989 113.63 92.65 92.65 94.61 
1990 108.82 96.34 96.34 93.25 
1991 b 82.30 82.30 79.06 
103.54 90.28 90.28 85.38 
• The average value of the two series (the buying and selling weight is 690 lbs). 
h Observations not needed for analysis. 
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multiplying wheat prices in 1991 dollars by the average yields per acre less variable 
production costs in 1991 dollars. For the purposes of the study, prices for inputs other 
than stocker steers, and quantities of inputs used were assumed to be deterministic. 
Thus, the production costs and input levels for the crop and livestock production 
activities were assumed to be fixed at 1991 levels. The estimated gross margins for the 
wheat production activities are summarized in Tables 19 and 20. 
Government Programs 
Previous researchers who have incorporated the provisions of government 
programs into risk programming models have used historical price distributions with 
historical prices replaced by the commodity loan rates when the latter were greater 
(Musser and Stamoulis; Scott and Baker). Crop historical prices were multiplied by 
historical yield observations to obtained the gross revenue distribution. Deficiency 
payments were added to each income value based on target price and commodity 
program yields. The modified income distribution was then used to calculate expected 
returns from participation in government programs. 
Modelling the government commodity programs poses crucial methodological 
questions, since the nature and structure of the programs have changed over time. There 
are two modelling choices: a) consider the government programs as varying over years 
and hence model the riskiness of participation using historical program parameters, b) 
regard historical program parameters as irrelevant in the current decision making context, 
and impose the current program parameters for the entire period under consideration 
treating the current program specifications as if they have been in effect throughout the 
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Table 19. Estimated Gross Margins of Grain Only Wheat Production Activities in 
1991 Prices, 1982-1991. 
Modified 
Year Chisel Plow-23crn Disk Plow-15crn Sweep No-Till No-Till 
1982 46.15 68.68 76.62 104.37 44.23 -11.33 -4.80 
1983 50.08 96.31 84.66 110.34 49.73 41.54 48.07 
1984 157.26 136.85 161.48 148.14 152.17 126.55 133.08 
1985 45.19 36.41 56.85 58.13 30.98 -28.62 -22.09 
1986 12.10 4.77 1.18 -2.14 5.86 -2.66 3.87 
1987 2.18 45.60 38.43 35.41 1.23 -51.87 -45.34 
1988 47.74 89.58 57.57 59.44 31.39 -54.60 -48.07 
1989 63.07 162.26 81.10 130.62 41.60 66.14 72.67 
1990 -26.26 -35.19 -30.64 -32.69 -24.18 -58.06 -51.53 
1991 5.01 -6.03 -3.56 15.06 6.83 -33.51 -26.98 
Mean 40.25 59.92 52.37 62.67 33.99 -0.64 5.89 
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Table 20. Estimated Gross Margins of Grain and Grazing Wheat Production Activities 
in 1991 Prices, (from grain only) 1982-1991. 
Modified 
Year Chisel Plow-23cm Disk Plow-15cm Sweep No-Till No-Till 
1982 39.23 61.77 70.71 97.48 37.33 -23.62 -17.09 
1983 43.17 89.40 78.75 103.43 42.83 29.25 35.78 
1984 150.35 129.94 155.57 141.23 145.27 114.26 120.79 
1985 38.28 29.50 50.94 51.22 24.08 -40.91 -34.38 
1986 5.19 -2.14 -4.73 -9.05 -1.04 -14.95 -8.42 
1987 -4.73 38.69 32.52 28.50 -5.58 64.16 -57.63 
1988 40.83 82.67 51.65 52.53 24.49 -66.89 -60.36 
1989 56.16 155.35 75.19 123.71 34.70 53.85 60.38 
1990 -33.17 -42.10 -36.55 -39.60 -31.08 -70.35 -63.82 
1991 -1.90 -12.94 -9.47 8.15 -.07 -45.00 -39.27 
Mean 33.34 53.01 46.46 55.76 27.09 -12.93 -6.40 
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period. In other words, the latter approach would evaluate risk as if the current program 
parameters had been in place throughout the entire time period used to generate the 
returns distributions. 
Mcsweeny and Kramer argued that as government programs have changed over 
the years, using historical program parameters, would not correctly depict the 
consequences of current program specifications on risk. They proposed a general method 
of modelling government programs, in which current program parameters are used as if 
the parameters had been in effect throughout the period of consideration. 
Based upon the work reported by Aw-Hassan and Stoecker, it was assumed, that 
if continuous wheat was grown on land classified as highly erodible because of water 
erosion, farmers who used either the Plow-23cm or the Plow-15cm system would be out 
of compliance and would not qualify for deficiency payments. However, farmers who 
used any of the other five alternative methods are assumed to meet conservation 
compliance requirements. 
Government Commodity Program Parameters 
Data required for modelling the government programs were: the program 
parameters such as the target price, national statutory loan rate, national effective loan 
rate, local loan rate and set-aside requirements of the 1991 program, and the 5-month 
and 12-month US average prices required for computing deficiency payments for wheat. 
All program parameters except the local loan rate were based on program provisions for 
the 1991 crop year. 
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The local loan rate for Garfield County was obtained from Teague et al. The 5-
month (June-October) and 12-month US average prices for the entire period were 
computed based on US average monthly prices published in Agricultural Prices (National 
Agricultural Statistics Services). Table 21 includes the program parameters which were 
used to calculate returns per acre for government program participation. These 
assumptions were used in calculating the gross returns per acre as if the 1991 government 
programs had been in place over the time period of 1982 to 1991. 
Table 22 includes the nominal and 1991 adjusted market prices, US-5 month 
average prices and US-12 month average prices. Mcsweeny and Kramer used 1984 
government programs parameters and adjusted all prices to 1984 prices using the index 
of price paid by farmers to put the past prices in 1984 dollars. 
The 1985 legislation divided deficiency payments into two parts: a primary 
deficiency payments and a final deficiency payment. The primary deficiency payment 
is what has traditionally been referred to as the deficiency payment. The final deficiency 
payment is made to farmers if the Secretary of Agriculture uses discretionary power to 
reduce the loan rate by 20 percent to promote exports (the loan rate after reduction is 
referred to as the national effective loan rate NELF). If this occurs, producers will 
receive a final deficiency payment to provide the same total return as if the loan rate had 
not been reduced. 
Deficiency payments are determined by the difference between the target price 
and the higher of the market price or the loan rate. For the purpose of computing 
deficiency payments, market price is a season average. The following equation adapted 
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Table 21. Commodity Program Parameters for Garfield County, North Central 
Oklahoma (1991 Crop Year). 
Parameter Wheat 
Target Price ($/bu.) 4.00 
National Statutory Loan Rate ($/bu.) 2.44 
National Effective Loan Rate ($/bu.) 1.95 
Local Loan Rate ($/bu.) 1.95• 
Deficiency Payment ($/bu.) 1.28 
Set-Aside (Percent) 5.00 
• Teague et al. 
Source: Agricultural Outlook, Economic Research Services, USDA, May 1993. 
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Table 22. Nominal and Adjusted (to 1991 dollars) U.S. Five Month Average Prices, 









































• Five month U.S. average price. 




































from Mcsweeny and Kramer was used to compute the different components of 
government payments. 
[MAX (MP, LLR)] Y + [TP - MAX (USSP, NSLR)] • PY• (1-SA-FA) 
+ [NSLR - MAX (US12P, NELR)] •PY• (1-SA-FA) [4.1] 
where, MP is the market price, LLR is the local loan rate, Y is the wheat yield, TP is 
the target price, USSP is the 5-month US average price, NSLR is the national statutory 
loan rate, PY is the program yield, SA is the set aside percent, FA is the normal FELX 
percent. US12P is the 12-month US average price and NELR is the national effective 
loan rate. The market price is the season average price. Government payments per acre 
are presented in Table 23. 
Set-Aside Acres 
To be eligible for deficiency payments, a producer must agree to set-aside a pre-
determined proportion of the farm's wheat base acres to conserving uses. However, 
wheat producers in Oklahoma have been permitted to seed wheat on the set-aside land 
and have been permitted to graze the set-aside land. Hence, the only restriction is that 
it not be harvested for grain and grazed beyond a specific date, usually May 15. In the 
case of grazed wheat production systems, the set-aside acres were modeled to be used 
in either grazing, grazing and grazeout, or grazeout activities. 
The model was constructed to provide for alternative uses of the set-aside acres. 
If the land is to be grazed, it is treated in the same fashion as the non set aside land 
except that it is not harvested. For non-grazed wheat production systems, the variable 
Table 23. Deficiency Payments and 0/92 Payments Estimated Risk Programming Model. 
US5P 
Target (1991 Deficiency Program Deficiency 
Price dollars) Payments Yield Payment 0/92 Payments 
Year $/bu $/bu $/bu bu/acre $/acre paidb $/acre paidb 
1982 4.00 4.70 35 
1983 4.00 4.66 35 
1984 4.00 4.33 35 
1985 4.00 3.64 0.36 35 12.60 11.60 
1986 4.00 2.75 1.25 35 43.75 40.25 
1987 4.00 2.80 1.20 35 42.00 38.64 
1988 4.00 4.02 35 
1989 4.00 4.15 
1990 4.00 2.78 1.22 35 42.70 39.28 
1991 4.00 2.78 1.22 35 42.70 39.28 
Mean 18.38 16.91 
a The deficiency payment is zero if the target price is less than the US5P and equal to the target price minus the US5P otherwise. 
b Acre paid = Base (1 - SA - FA), where SA = set-aside percent and FA = normal flex percent. 
~ 
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cost per acre for set-aside for each of the alternative tillage systems were adjusted to 
reflect maintenance cost by assuming certain field operations would be conducted {Table 
24). 
0/92 Program 
In addition to the government commodity programs as described above, the 0/92 
program is also available to wheat farmers. Under this program, producers are allowed 
to devote all or a portion of their wheat base acres to conserving uses and receive 
deficiency payments of 92 percent {Table 23) of what would have been received if wheat 
had been planted and harvested for grain subject to the set.:.aside provision. Farmers have 
the choice of allocating some proportion of their wheat acreage base to this program and 
be paid deficiency payments on that proportion on the 0/92 basis and to receive regular 
commodity program participation payments from the base acres allocated to the regular 
program. Base acres allocated to the 0/92 program may be seeded to wheat and grazed 
until June 1. The model was constructed such that any proportion of the wheat acreage 
base may be allocated to the 0/92 program. 
Model Structure and Parametric Solutions 
A conventional LP model is constructed to maximize expected total gross margins 
subject to technical, resource, and non-negativity constraints. The Target MOTAD 
model as described in Chapter m is constructed to maximize expected returns subject to 
technical, resource, and non-negativity constraints, and subject to achieving a targeted 
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level of income. A basic LP model was constructed and extended into a Target MOTAD 
model. This was done to incorporate risk as measured by two parameters. These are 
the target level T, and the level of expected short-fall from T as defined by A ( equation 
3.29). 
McCamley and Kliebenstein determined that the optimal solution for any specific 
combination of T and A typically shares a basis with optimal solutions for a large number 
of other T and A combinations. Therefore, although the number of Target MOT AD 
enterprise mixtures is usually infinite, the number of bases associated with these mixtures 
is finite. Given a value of A, there exists a target income, denoted by TL(A), such that 
the model with a target income level less than T L(A) win be identical to the deterministic 
linear programming solution. There also exists another target income value, denoted by 
Tu(A), such that a model with a target income exceeding Tu(A) is infeasible (Zimet and 
Spreen). In this study, the TL(A) and Tu(A) for A = 0, were determined for each 
scenario. Then several target income levels that have values between TL(A) and Tu(A) 
were used in the analysis when negative income deviation are prohibited and negative 
income deviation ignored. Moreover, a target income is specified for the farm • risk 
is measured as the expected short fall (A) from the target. The parameter A was initially 
set at a large value. In this case, the Target MOTAD model was equivalent to the 
deterministic linear programming. As A was reduced, solutions that varied from the 
deterministic LP occurred. All optimal solutions and associated farm plans are reported. 
The parametric routine of MPSX as described in Chapter 6 of Hazell and Norton was 
used to identify the basis change points on the expected mean deviation below the target 
frontier. 
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The livestock activities which used wheat pasture during grazing and grazeout 
months were linked to wheat activities (grazing, grazing and grazeout, and grazeout) with 
balance or transfer rows. 
Mixed Integer Programming 
A basic assumption of standard linear programming is that the activities in the 
model are continuous variables. That is, they can take on noninteger values. 
Participation in the government program can not be treated as a continuous variable. It 
is an either-or proposition and may be considered a zero-one type integer variable which 
takes on a value of one if it is economical for the farm to participate and a value of zero 
if participation is not economical. 
An evaluation of the economics of government program participation with 
traditional linear programming would require that two models be solved -- one for 
participation and another for nonparticipation. The more profitable of the two would be 
the optimal choice. Any time a variable is changed, both models should be solved and 
the solutions compared. This procedure was followed in this study for evaluating 
government programs participation. If the program participation decision had been set 
up as a zero/one integer variable, with appropriate relationships to the non-integer crop-
mix variables, the model would directly determine the optimal of combined program 
participation and crop mix decision (Hoag and Holloway). 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this study was to generate information which could be used by 
Oklahoma farmers who produce wheat for grain and grazing. More specifically, the 
model as described in the previous chapter was designed to determine the economics of 
alternative tillage systems for wheat production; the economic consequences of 
noncompliance and nonparticipation as well as compliance and participation in wheat 
commodity programs; and the economics of grazing the wheat forage under the 
institutional constraints of the wheat programs. It was designed to determine risk 
efficient tillage and government program participation strategies for Oklahoma farmers 
who produce wheat for grain as well as farmers who produce wheat for grain and 
grazing. 
This chapter includes a presentation and analysis of the results of the risk 
programming model. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section includes 
the results for models which did not include grazing activities. These models are 
designed to represent farms in the region which produce wheat for grain. The second 
section includes a summary of the results from models designed to represent farms on 
which wheat is produced for both grain and forage production. The value of the forage 




Risk efficient farm plans are generated which would be appropriate for risk 
neutral as well as risk averse farmers. The Target MOTAD method was used to 
determine the risk efficient farm plans for six alternative situations as follows: 
Scenario 1: Grain, no participation in government commodity programs. 
Scenario 2: Grain, participation in government commodity programs with land 
not classified as highly erodible. 
Scenario 3: Grain, participation in government commodity programs with land 
classified as highly erodible. 
Scenario 4: Grain and Forage for Stocker Steers, no participation in 
government commodity programs. 
Scenario 5: Grain and Forage for Stocker Steers, participation in government 
commodity programs with land not classified as highly erodible. 
Scenario 6: Grain and Forage for Stocker Steers, participation in government 
commodity programs with land classified as highly erodible. 
The following sections contain the results of the analysis for the six scenarios. 
Based upon the work reported by Aw-Hassan and Stoecker, it was assumed that if 
continuous wheat was grown on land classified as highly erodible because of water 
erosion, farmers who use either the Plow-23 or the Plow-15 system would be out of 
compliance and would not qualify for deficiency payments. However, all other wheat 
production systems (Disk, Sweep, Chisel, No-till, Modified No-till) are assumed to meet 
conservation compliance requirements. A listing of the abbreviated names and a 
descriptive summary for the activities of the model is included in Table 25. 
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The production of one acre of wheat 
for grain with the chisel tillage 
system. 
The production of one acre of wheat 
for grain with the disk tillage 
system. 
The production of one acre of wheat 
for grain with the plow-15cm tillage 
system. 
The production of one acre of wheat 
for grain with the sweep tillage 
system. 
The production of one acre of wheat 
for grain and grazing with the disk 
tillage system. 
The production of one acre of wheat 
for grain and grazing with the plow-
15 cm tillage system. 
The production of one acre of wheat 
for grazing and grazeout with the 
sweep tillage system. 
One acre of set-aside tilled with chisel 
system. 
One acre of set-aside tilled with the 
disk tillage system. 
One acre of set-aside tilled with the 
plow-15cm tillage system. 
One acre set-aside tilled with the 
sweep tillage system. 






One acre of set-aside prepared for 
wheat grazing and grazeout with the 
disk tillage system. 
One acre of set-aside prepared for 
wheat grazing and grazeout with the 
plow-15cm tillage system. 
The production of one stocker steer 
on winter wheat pasture from 
November to March 1. 
The production of one stocker steer 
on winter wheat pasture from 
November to May 1. 
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Tillage Strategies for a Wheat Grain Farm 
This section includes a summary of the results of the mathematical programming 
analysis for a representative Oklahoma wheat farm. Results are presented which would 
be relevant for decisions makers who seek to maximize profit and can be said to be risk 
neutral as well as for producers who are risk averse. 
Grain Farm Plans for Risk Neutral Producers 
The appropriate objective function for a farmer who is risk neutral is to maximize 
expected returns. The mix of activities which will maximize expected returns can be 
obtained by standard linear programming (LP). The risk neutral results for Scenarios 1, 
2, and 3 are summarized in Table 26. 
The optimal strategy is to moldboard plow (Plow-15) the entire farm for both 
Scenarios 1 and 2. If the land is classified as highly erodible, and the farmer elects to 
participate in the government program, the Disk system is most economical. The 
expected return to the land, family labor, overhead, and management resources of the 
farm which chooses to not participate in the government commodity program (Scenario 
1) is $34,336. Participation is expected to generate an average deficiency payment of 
$8,372 per year. The participating farm has an expected return of $40,790 if the land 
is nonerodible, and $35,351 if the land is erodible. 
The results indicate that nonparticipation (Scenario 1) in the government programs 
is costly, and depending upon the farmer's utility function, may be irrational. 
Nonparticipation results in the lowest income and the highest variance across the three 
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Table 26. Profit Maximization Plans (LP Solution) for Three Scenarios for the Wheat 
for Grain Farm. 
Farm Plan 
Characteristic Unit Scenario 1• Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Expected Return $ 34,336 40,790 35,351 
s.d. $ 32,379 22,935 21,225 
c.v. 94 56 60 
Activity 
Plow-15 acre 570 542 
Disk acre 542 
SPL15 acre 28b 
SDI acre 28 
Average Deficiency $ 8,372 8,372 
Payment 
Capital $ 15,396 14,626 13,120 
• Scenario 1 represents a farm that is not enrolled in the wheat commodity program. 
Scenarios 2 and 3 represent farms that are enrolled for participation in the program, 
with 2 on nonerodible land and 3 on erodible land. 
b To qualify for deficiency payments, 5 percent (28 acres) of the base acres must be set-
aside to conserving uses. 
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grain only scenarios. For those farmers whose utility functions can be expressed in 
terms of expected returns and variance, the nonparticipation scenario would not be 
appropriate. It is dominated by both the optimal plans for Scenario 2 and Scenario 3, 
since they both have greater expected returns and lower variance of expected returns. 
It is clear that government programs increase the expected returns, decrease the variance 
of expected returns, and are important for wheat producers in the region. 
Grain Farm Plans for Risk Averse Producers 
Target MOT AD was used to identify farm plans which would be appropriate for 
farmers who are risk averse. Feasible target income levels were arbitrarily selected such 
that the initial value of A was set to zero. TL(A) was estimated to be $-20,000, while 
Tu(A) was $1,000. These two target incomes and several others that have a value 
between TL(A) and Tu(A) were chosen for the analysis. The parameter A was initially set 
to zero such that income deviations below the target were prohibited. The parametric 
programming routine of MPSX was used to parameterize the value of A to identify all 
basis changes until the Target MOTAD solution was equivalent to the deterministic linear 
programming solution. At each change of basis, the value of A and the corresponding 
optimal solution and associated enterprise mix for each target income were reported. 
Scenario 1. The optimal plan, expected income, and corresponding value of A 
and T at which basis changes occurred for Scenario 1 are presented in Table 27. As 
could be expected, in the models which include only wheat for grain production 
activities, there is little opportunity for risk management by diversification. In the 
absence of government commodity programs, and with no opportunity to produce other 
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Table 27. Target MOTAD Farm Plans for the Wheat for Grain Farm Which Does Not 
Participate in the Government Programs. 




















A -1,000 2,026 
• The plans selected for stochastic dominance analysis. 
b Land that is not farmed. 











































crops, or to produce forage for livestock, the producer has little choice. The optimal 
strategy is to use the Plow-15 system. It is the only strategy among those reported in 
Table 27, for which all the land is farmed. 
Scenario 2. Results for Scenario 2 are reported in Table 28. This scenario 
extended the previous scenario to include government commodity program participation. 
Provisions for set-aside requirements for the standard wheat program, deficiency 
payments, and the 0/92 program were incorporated into the model. Participation on the 
570 acres of wheat base requires that 28 acres (5 percent of the base) be set aside to 
conserving uses. Harvest of the 5,percent set aside is prohibited. However, harvest of 
the 15 percent mandatory flexible acres is optional whereas harvest of the remaining 80 
percent is required. Hence the full deficiency payment, which has an expected value of 
$8,372, may be received as long as 80 percent (456 acres) but no more than 95 percent 
(542 acres) is harvested for grain. 
For Scenario 2 TL(A) was estimated to be $400 and T11(A) $7,000. Several target 
income levels ranging from $400 to $7,000 were arbitrarily selected. For each level of 
target income A was parameterized from zero to the level necessary to obtain the profit 
maximizing solution. Farm plans generated under Scenario 2 are presented in Table 28. 
The results for Scenario 2 are essentially the same as those for Scenario 1. The 
appropriate strategy is to use the Plow-15 system. However, when provided the option 
to participate in the government program, it is clearly optimal to do so. One alternative 
is to use the Plow-15 system on 456 acres, set aside 24 acres to conserving uses and idle 
the 90 mandatory flexible acres. However, this alternative would reduce the expected 
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Table 28. Target MOTAD Farm Plans for the Wheat for Grain Farm Which has 
Nonerodible Land and Participates in the Government Programs. 
Plana Target Expected Expected Avg. Activities Levels 
Return Deviation Return Def. Pay. 
Slack" Plow- Sweep SPL15 SSW 
15 
acres 
400 0 40,789" 8,372 542 28d 
1,000 0 39,798 8,372 523 28 19 
1,000 58 40,789 8,372 542 28 
G 2,000 0 38,097 8,372 495 26 49 
2,000 158 40,789 8,372 542 28 
H 3,000 0 36,398 8,372 467 24 79 
3,000 258 40,789 8,372 542 28 
4,000 0 33,745 8,372 385 71 20 4 90 
F 4,000 62 35,765 8,372 456 24 90 
4,000 358 40,789 8,372 542 28 
5,000 0 30,534 8,372 272 184 14 10 90 
5,000 162 35,765 8,372 456 24 90 
5,000 458 40,789 8,372 542 28 
6,000 0 27,322 8,372 158 498 8 16 90 
6,000 262 35,765 8,372 456 24 90 
6,000 558 40,789 8,372 542 28 
7,000 0 24,111 8,372 45 411 2 22 90 
7,000 362 35,765 8,372 456 24 90 
E 7,000 658 40,789 8,372 542 28 
• The plans selected for stochastic dominance analysis. 
b Land that is not farmed. 
• LP solution. 
d The model is based on the assumptions of a 5 percent set aside requirement (28 acres) and a 15 percent mandatory 
flexible acres requirement. Also, 80 percent of the base (456 acres) must be harvested for grain to qualify for the 
full deficiency payment ($8,372). 
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income by $5,024 from $40,789 to $35,765. The results obtained for Scenario 2 are 
similar to those obtained for Scenario 1 in which only the profit maximizing farm plan 
utilizes all land. 
Scenario 3. This scenario differs from 2 in that the land is assumed to be highly 
erodible such that the use of tillage systems which include a moldboard plow operation 
(Plow-23 and Plow-15) are not permitted. By assumption, farmers who use a moldboard 
plow on land classified as highly erodible would not fulfill conservation compliance 
requirements and would not qualify for deficiency payments. 
A summary of results for Scenario 3 is presented in Table 29. As with both 
Scenarios 1 and 2, the farm is provided with few alternatives and has little opportunity 
to reduce risk by diversification. All plans which were generated include full 
participation in the commodity program which requires a set aside of 28 acres to 
conserving uses. When use of the moldboard plow systems are not permitted, the most 
economical alternative is the Disk system. The farm may elect to idle the mandatory 
flexible acres. However, to do so results in a decrease in the expected income from 
$35,351 by $4,181 to $31,170. 
In summary, the results of the Target MOTAD analysis of Scenarios 1, 2, and 
3 do not provide much additional information beyond that which would be generated 
from standard model constructed to maximize expected income. Plow-15 is the dominant 
system for Scenarios 1 and 2. However, for land classified as highly erodible, the Disk 
system is dominant. Participation in the government commodity program increases the 
expected returns and decreases the variance of expected returns. It is an important risk 
management tool for those farmers who produce wheat for grain in Oklahoma. 
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Table 29. Target MOTAD Farm Plans for the Wheat for Grain Farm Which has 
Erodible Land and Participates in the Government Program. 
Plan• Target Expected Expected Avg. Activities Levels 
Return Deviation Return Def. Pay. Disk Sweep SDI SSW Slaclc' 
$ acres 
I 1,650 0 35,351° 8,372 542 28d 
2,000 0 34,811 8,372 529 28 13 
2,000 35 35,351 8,372 542 28 
K 3,000 0 33,298 8,372 499 26 45 
3,000 135 35,351 8,372 542 28 
4,000 0 31,786 8,372 468 25 77 
4,000 235 35,351 8,372 542 28 
L 5,000 0 29,517 8,372 366 90 19 5 90 
1 5,000 59 31,170 8,372 456 24 90 
5,000 335 35,351 8,372 542 28 
6,000 435 35,351 8,372 542 28 
6,000 0 26,730 8,372 213 243 11 13 90 
6,000 159 31,170 8,372 456 24 90 
7,000 0 23,942 8,372 61 395 3 21 90 
7,000 259 31,170 8,372 456 24 90 
7,000 535 35,351 8,372 542 28 
a The plans selected for stochastic dominance analysis. 
b Land that is not farmed. 
• LP solution. 
d The model is based on the assumption of a 5 percent set-aside requirement (28 acres) and a 15 percent mandatory 
flexible acres requirement. Also, 80 percent of the base (456 acres) must be harvested for grain to qualify for the 
full deficiency parymetn ($8,372). 
101 
Tillage Strategies for a Wheat Grain and Forage Farm 
This section includes a summary of the results of the risk programming analysis 
for a representative Oklahoma farm on which wheat may be produced for both grain and 
forage. The forage is assumed to be produced for grazing by stocker steers. Hence, the 
models include stocker production as well as wheat production activities. The stockers 
may graze during the winter, in which case the grain may be harvested. Alternatively, 
stockers may graze during the winter and spring (grazeout), or during the spring 
(grazeout), in which case the wheat is assumed to produce no grain. 
Grain and Forage Farm Plans for Risk Neutral Producers 
As noted previously, the utility maximizing plan for a risk neutral decision maker 
is the plan which maximizes expected returns. This plan can be determined by a 
standard linear programming model. The results of the models for the representative 
Oklahoma wheat-stocker farm are presented in Table 30. The expected incomes are 
$50,302, $57,323, and $52,552 for Scenarios 4, 5, and 6, respectively. 
Participation in government programs is clearly economical. An average 
deficiency payment of $8,372 is estimated for both participating farms. If the land is 
nonerodible, participation adds $7,021 to expected income. For erodible land, 
participation adds $2,250. Participation also reduces the variability of expected returns. 
The coefficient of variation is 57 for Scenario 5, 59 for Scenario 6, and 82 for 
nonparticipation, Scenario 4. Therefore, participation in government commodity 
programs not only increases the expected return but 'also reduces risk. 
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Table 30. Profit Maximization Plans (LP Solution) for Three Scenarios for the Farm 
Which May Produce Wheat for Grain and Forage. 
Farm Plan 
Characteristics Unit Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 
Expected Return $ 50,302 57,323 52,552 
s.d. 41,562 32,507 31,235 
c.v. 82 57 59 
Activity 
GGPL15 acre 570 542 
GGDI acre 542 
SGGOPL15 acre 28 
SGGODI acre 28 
STKWW head 285 257 257 
STKGZ head 28 28 
Average Deficiency $ 8,372 8,372 
Payment 
Capital Requirements $ 69,426 70,167 68,588 
• Scenario 4 represents a farm that is not enrolled in the wheat commodity program. 
Scenarios 5 and 6 represent farms that are enrolled for participation in the program, 
with 5 on nonerodible land and 6 on erodible land. 
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The optimal tillage strategy includes the use of a moldboard plow (Plow-15) for 
both the nonparticipation scenario and the nonerodible land participation scenario. For 
land classified as highly erodible, the Disk tillage strategy is optimal. It was assumed 
that the tillage system used to produce wheat for grain would also be used on that portion 
of the land required for set aside. 
A maximum stocking density of one-half stocker steer per acre was assumed for 
winter grazing and one stocker steer per acre for spring grazing (grazeout). For Scenario 
4 (nonparticipation), the optimal strategy is to fully stock the 570 acres which are seeded 
to wheat. Hence, the optimal farm plan is to winter graze 285 stockers on the wheat. 
The optimal plan for those who opt for participation, Scenarios 5 and 6, is to seed 
the entire 570 acres to wheat and fully stock with 285 stockers. On or about March 1, 
257 of the 285 stockers should be sold. The remaining 28 animals should be 
concentrated at a stocking density of one animal per acre on the 28 set-aside acres (5 
percent of the 570 acre wheat base). The set-aside acres should be "grazed out" and the 
28 remaining steers sold on or about May 1. 
Grain and Forage Farm Plans for Risk Averse Producers 
Target MOTAD was used to generate risk efficient farm plans for the alternative 
tillage strategies for the grain and forage representative farms. Methods similar to those 
described previously were employed. 
Scenario 4. Results for Scenario 4, the nonparticipation strategy, are reported in 
Table 31. No set-aside requirement or restrictions on: tillage systems were imposed. By 
definition, the farm did not qualify for deficiency payments. The TL(A) and Tu(A) for 
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A = 0, were estimated to be -$5,000 and $4,000. Several target income levels between -
$5,000 to $4,000 were used and A was parameterized from zero to the level necessary 
to achieve the profit maximization (LP) solution. Moreover, two target levels of $15,000 
and $30,000 were specified for the farm. The parameter A was initially set at a large 
value. In this case, the Target MOTAD model was equivalent to the deterministic linear 
programming as A was reduced, solutions that varied from the deterministic linear 
programming. 
The optimal farm plans, expected income, and corresponding value of A and T 
at which basis changes occurred are presented in Table 31. Ten plans in addition to the 
LP solution were identified. For each of the eleven plans the entire 570 acres is seeded 
to wheat. For 14 of the 17 plans, all 570 acres are winter grazed. 
The optimal tillage strategy is to moldboard (Plow-15) all land which is used to 
produce wheat for grain and to use the Sweep system to produce wheat for grazeout. 
Since forage yield data were not collected in the experiment station study, the yield of 
forage is assumed to be the same across all tillage systems. Hence, the model selects the 
least expensive tillage system for use on land devoted to the production of wheat for 
grazeout. 
Three of the plans call for less than full stocking. The diversified plan generated 
for a target income level of $4,000 with zero deviation, includes 424 acres tilled with the 
Plow-15 system and 146 acres tilled with the Sweep system. All of the 146 Sweep acres 
should be winter grazed and grazed out. However, the plan calls for winter grazing only 
315 of the 424 Plow-15 acres. All of the Plow-15 acres should be harvested for grain. 
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Table 31. Target MOTAD Farm Plans for the Wheat Grain and Forage Farm Which 
Does Participate in Government Programs. 
Plan• Target Expected Expected Activities Levels 
Return Deviation Return 
$ Plow-15 GGPL15 GGOSW STKWW STKGZ 
acres head--
M -5,000 0 50,302" 570 285 
-3,000 0 49,327 544 26 259 26 
-3,000 207 50,302 570 285 
-1,000 0 48,387 519 51 234 51 
-1,000 407 50,302 570 285 
N 1,000 0 47,448 495 75 210 75 
1,000 417 49,405 546 24 261 24 
1,000 638 50,302 570 285 
2,000 0 46,568 10 468 91 188 91 
2,000 19 46,979 482 88 197 88 
2,000 838 50,302 570 285 
3,000 0 44,250 60 391 118 137 118 
3,000 103 46,509 470 100 185 100 
3,000 1,038 50,302 570 285 
0 4,000 0 41,933 109 315 146 85 146 
p 4,000 187 46,040 457 113 172 113 
15,000 1,613 40,874 321 249 36 249 
15,000 1,668 43,121 380 190 95 190 
15,000 3,438 50,302 570 285 
30,000 6,251 44,969 429 141 144 141 
30,000 6,263 45,254 437 133 152 133 
30,000 7,065 49,882 559 11 274 11 
30,000 7,231 50,302 570 285 
40,000 11,090 39,513 285 285 285 
40,000 11,692 50,302 570 285 
a The plans selected for stochastic dominance analysis. 
b LP solution. 
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The plan calls for a total of 231 stockers for winter grazing with 85 sold on March 1 and 
the remaining 146 concentrated on the Sweep acres for grazeout. The expected income 
with this plan is reduced from $50,302 for the LP plan by $8,369 to $41,933. The plans 
reported in Table 31 indicate that winter grazing and grazeout options do provide 
opportunities for wheat producers in the region to reduce risk by diversification. Figure 
5 present the E-MDBT frontiers for some target income in this scenario. 
Scenario 5. Farm plans for producers who participate in government programs 
and farm nonerodible land (Scenario 5) are presented in Table 32. Seven plans, 
including the LP solution, were identified. All plans call for full participation. That is 
5 percent of the land should be set aside for conserving uses in exchange for an expected 
deficiency payment of $8,372. All plans call for seeding the entire 570 acres to wheat. 
Ten of the eleven plans indicate that all land seeded to wheat should be winter grazed. 
Diversification can be achieved by reducing the number of stockers. For 
example, to achieve a target income of $22,000 with zero deviation, the plan calls for 
use of the Plow-15 system on 480 acres, and the Sweep system on 90 acres. The plan 
includes 260 winter stockers with all but 48 of the Plow-15 acres winter grazed. A total 
of 149 of the stockers should be sold on or about March 1 with the remaining 111 
retained on the grazeout acres and sold on May 1. The expected income from this 
diversified strategy is reduced from $57,323 for the LP solution by $4,531 to $52,792. 
However, the downside risk is reduced with the diversified strategy in which the target 
income of $22,000 is expected to be achieved in all periods (for all states of nature). 
Figure 6 present the E-MDBT frontiers for some target incomes in this scenario. 
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Figure 5. E-MDBT Frontiers (Scenario 4) 
Table 32. Target MOTAD Farm Plans for the Wheat Grain and Forage Farm Which has Nonerodible Land and Participates in the 
Government Programs. 
Plmt Tara,ot Expecl<d Expecl<d A"""'F Dellcla,oy A"""'F0/92 Ac:tivltioo l.ovela 
Relutn Doviatkin Relutn p.,_. Pa~ ------- --bead--
Plow-Ucm GGPl.15 GGOSW SGGOPLU STKWW STKGZ 
R 16,500 0 57,m• 8,372 S42' 28 257 28 
17,000 0 57,D5S 8,372 S42 8 28 249 36 
17,000 SB 57,323 8,372 S42 28 257 28 
s 18,000 0 56,594 8,372 S22 21 'J:1 237 48 
18,000 lSB 57,323 8,372 S42 28 257 28 
19,000 0 56,134 8,372 SlO 33 'J:1 22S 6CJ 
19,000 2S8 57,323 8,372 542 28 257 28 
211,000 0 SS,673 8,372 4'T1 47 26 212 73 
211,000 3S8 57,323 8,372 S42 28 257 28 
T 22,000 0 S2,792 8,372 48 409 90 23 149 lll 
u 22,000 83 54,7S3 8,372 473 72 2S 188 '17 
22,000 732 57,323 8,372 S42 28 257 28 
30,000 1,834 S3,SSO 8,11¥7 2S3 441 1116 23 1S6 129 
30,000 1,838 S4,129 8,372 4S6 90 24 171 114 
30,000 1,879 SS,S28 8,372 493 Sl 26 208 77 
30,000 2,332 57,323 8,372 S42 28 257 28 
4S,OOO 7,S46 56,236 8,372 S12 31 'J:1 227 SB 
4S,OOO 7,599 57,323 8,372 S42 28 257 28 
• Tho plam "°""""'1 for IIOdmllc dcmbm,ce analysis. 
• LP oolulicn. 
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Figure 6. E-MDBT Frontiers (Scenario 5) 
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Scenario 6. Results for Scenario 6 are summarized in Table 33. These results 
were generated for a producer who farms land classified as highly .erodible and who 
chooses to participate in government programs. Eleven unique plans are presented in the 
table. Expected incomes range from $52,552 for the profit maximizing LP solution, to 
$42,776 for a diversified plan generated with the restriction of zero deviation from a 
target income level of $19,000. In general, the Disk system is optimal for land which 
is seeded to produce grain, and the Sweep system for land seeded to be grazed out. 
Four of the Scenario 6 plans include the use of the 0/92 provision of the 
government program. For example, consider the plan which generates the target income 
of $17,000 with zero expected deviation. The expected return is $46,581. Total 
government payments for the plan are estimated to be $8,201, with $1,995 resulting from 
the 0/92 payment. While all of the land is seeded to wheat, only 338 of the 570 acres 
are harvested for grain. 
With 5 percent set aside and 15 percent mandatory flexible acres, deficiency 
payments can be made on a maximum of 456 acres for a farm which has 570 acres of 
wheat base (570 acres minus 5 percent set aside and 15 percent mandatory flexible 
acres). (The maximum deficiency payment is $18.36 per acre for the 456 qualifying 
acres for a total of $8,372 for the farm.) To qualify for full payment the wheat must be 
harvested for grain. In the case of the plan generated for the $17,000 target income with 
zero expected deviation, the full deficiency payment is made for the 338 acres which are 
harvested for grain. The payment is 338 times $18.36 ($6,206). The remaining 118 
acres are enrolled in the 0/92 program. They may not be harvested for grain but may 
Table 33. Target MOTAD Farm Plans for the Wheat Grain and Forage Farm Which has Erodible Land and Participates in the 
Government Programs. 
Average Average 
Plan Target Expected Expected Deficiency 0/92 Activity Levels 
Return Deviation Return Payments Payments CHSEL GGDI GGOSW SCH SGGODI STKWW STKGZ 
$ acres --~~head~~~ 
11,000 0 52,552b 8,372 542' 28 257 28 
13,000 0 50,652 8,372 475 70 25 190 95 
13,000 202 52,552 8,372 542 28 257 28 
w 15,000 0 48,523 7,399 896 403 145 22 118 165 
z 15,000 143 50,111 8,372 456 90 24 171 114 
15,000 402 52,552 8,372 542 28 257 28 
X 17,000 0 46,581 6,206 1,995 338 214 18 53 232 
18,000 343 50,111 8,372 456 90 24 171 114 
17,000 602 52,552 8,372 542 28 257 28 
y 19,000 0 42,776 6,848 1,404 115 258 178 6 14 33 191 
19,000 543 50,111 8,372 456 90 24 171 114 
19,000 776 52,307 8,372 533 9 28 248 37 
V 19,000 868 52,552 8,372 542 28 257 28 
30,000 2,430 49,766 8,152 186 445 102 23 160 125 
30,000 2,448 50,111 8,372 456 90 24 171 114 
30,000 2,536 51,145 8,372 492 52 26 207 78 
30,000 3,068 52,552 8,372 542 28 257 28 
40,000 6,179 52,552 8,372 542 28 257 28 
• The plans selected for stochastic dominance analysis. 
b LP solution. 
• The model is based on the assumptions of a 5 percent set-aside rewirement (28 acres) and a 15 percent mandatory flexible acres requirement. Also, 80 percent of the base ( 456 acres) must be 
harvested for grain to qualify for the full deficiency payment ($8,3 2). 
---
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be winter grazed and grazed out. The per acre payment for these 118 acres is 92 percent 
of that received for harvested acres. For the plan it is 92 percent of $18.36 times 118 
acres ($1,995). 
The Disk system should be used on the 338 acres which are harvested for grain. 
And, consistent with results discussed for other scenarios, the land seeded for grazeout 
should be tilled with the Sweep system since it is the least expensive tillage method and 
forage yield is assumed to be equivalent across all tillage systems. All 570 acres should 
be winter grazed with 285 stockers. Fifty-three should be sold in March and the 
remaining 232 concentrated on 232 acres for graze out. Figure 7 present the E-MDBT 
for some target income levels in this scenario. 
Stochastic Dominance Analysis 
The application of stochastic dominance to evaluate alternative production 
strategies has become widely established. By construction, farm plans generated by 
Target MOTAD will be members of the ·second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) 
efficient set {Tauer). For example, all the farm plans which are reported in Table 33 are 
members of the SSD set for producers in the region who produce wheat for grain and 
forage and who farm erodible land. In this section stochastic dominance with respect to 
a function (SDRF) is employed to further evaluate the risk efficiency of the plans 
generated in the Target MOT AD analysis. In addition, participation plans are directly 
evaluated with nonparticipation plans for both land not classified as highly erodible as 
well as for land classified as highly erodible. 
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Figure 7. E-MDBT Frontiers (Scenario 6) 
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As described in Chapter III, SDRF is an efficiency criterion which orders 
uncertain choices for decision makers whose absolute risk-aversion function lies within 
specific lower and upper bounds. It establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the distribution of outcome defined by the cumulative distribution function (CDF) F(Y) 
to be preferred to that defined by the an alternative CDF G(Y) by all individuals whose 
absolute risk aversion functions lie everywhere between lower and upper bound r1(Y) and 
r2(Y) (King and Robison). 
For this analysis, risk aversion intervals (-0.0008 to -0.0001), (-0.0001 to 
0.0001), (0.0001 to 0.0004), and 0.0004 to 0.001) were selected to represent risk-
"'[preferring, risk-neutral, slightly risk-averse, and strongly risk-averse decision makers. 
A software package developed by Cochran and Raskin was used to conduct the analysis. 
Four farm plans were selected arbitrarily from those generated for Scenarios 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The selected plans are denoted in Tables 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, and 33. 
For every comparison and all risk intervals, plans which did not include the stocker 
production activities were dominated by plans which did include stocker production. 
Thus, the discussion of the SDRF analysis includes few, if any, references to the 
dominated plans A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, which do not include stocker production 
activities. 
SDRF Plans for Nonerodible Land 
The results of the analysis for comparing nonparticipation plans M, N, 0, and P 
from Table 31 and participation plans for nonerodible land, R, S, T, and U from Table 
32 are presented in Table 34. Plan Mis the only member of the risk-preferring set. A 
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Table 34. Results of the Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function Analysis for 
a Farm with Land Not Classified as Highly Erodible. 
Risk A version Interval 
-0.0008 to -0.0001 risk preferring 
-0.0001 to 0.0001 risk neutral 
0.0001 to 0.0004 slightly risk averse 
0.0004 to 0.001 strongly risk averse 
• See Tables 31 and 32 for detail. 
Dominant Strategy• 
M 
M, R, S, and U 
Uand T 
T 
Table 35. Results of Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function Analysis for 
a Farm with Land Classified as Highly Erodible. 
Risk Aversion Interval 
-0.0008 to -0.0001 risk preferring 
-0.0001 to 0.0001 risk neutral 
0.0001 to 0.0004 slightly risk averse 
0.0004 to .001 strongly risk averse 
• See Tables 31 and 33 for detail. 
Dominant Strategy• 
V 




farmer who prefers risk should not participate in the government program, till with Plow-
15, seed all land to wheat, fully stock for winter grazing, and harvest the grain. Four 
of the eight plans are members of the risk neutral set. 
Plan U and T are the only member of the SDRF slightly risk averse sets. Plan 
U, which is described in Table 32, is a diversified plan generated for Scenario 5 
(nonerodible participation). A producer who followed plan U would (a) fully participate 
in the government program; (b) seed the entire farm to wheat; (c) stock the entire 
acreage for winter grazing; (d) use a moldboard plow on land seeded for grain harvest; 
(e) use the relatively inexpensive Sweep system on the land seeded for grazeout; (f) 
grazeout 97 acres (17 percent of the land) with 97 head; and (g) harvest 473 acres for 
grain. 
SDRF Plans for Erodible Land 
The results of the analysis for comparing nonparticipation plans M, N, O, and P 
from Table 31 and participation plans for erodible land, V, W, X, and Y from Table 33 
are presented in Table 35. Plan Vis the only member of the risk-preferring set. A 
farmer who prefers risk and farms erodible land should participate in the government 
program, till with the Disk system, seed all land to wheat, fully stock for winter grazing, 
harvest 95 percent of the wheat base, and graze out the required 5 percent set aside. 
Seven of the eight plans are members of the risk neutral set. Plan O which is not 
included in the set has an expected income of $41,933 which is $4,107 less than the next 
lowest expected income plan. 
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Plan X and Y are the only member of the SDRF slightly risk averse sets. Plan 
X, which is described in Table 33, is a diversified plan generated for Scenario 6 
(participation with erodible land). A producer who followed plan X would (a) fully 
participate in the government program; (b) seed the entire farm to wheat; (c) use the 
Disk system on land seeded for grain harvest; (d) use the relatively inexpensive Sweep 
system on the land seeded for grazeout; and (e) harvest 338 acres (60 percent); and (f) 
participate in 0/92 program. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
This chapter includes a summary of the thesis. The summary is presented in 
terms of a brief review of the material presented in the preceding chapters. The review 
is followed by a summary of the overall conclusions of the study. The chapter concludes 
with a listing of noted limitations and shortcomings of the analysis. 
Thesis Summary 
The first chapter includes a description of Oklahoma's agricultural sector, its 
importance to the State's economy, and its contribution to gross state product. Winter 
wheat is by far the most important field crop produced in the State. In addition to its 
importance for producing high quality hard red winter wheat grain, wheat is a vitally 
important forage crop. 
Livestock may be pastured on nutritious wheat forage during the winter months. 
If grazing is terminated in late winter, typically early March, the wheat will produce a 
normal grain crop. Many farmers in Oklahoma use standing winter wheat forage for the 
production of stocker cattle, especially young beef steers. 
Government programs have been an important factor in the production of wheat 
for forage and grain. Over most of the history of federal price support programs, 
farmers have been required to idle, or set aside, some of their cropland to qualify for 
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price supports and deficiency payments. Grain may not be harvested from the set aside 
acres. However, Oklahoma producers have been permitted to seed the set aside to wheat 
and graze it during the winter and spring. 
By 1995, farmers who farm highly erodible land will be required to fully 
implement soil conserving production practices to maintain eligibility for federal 
deficiency payments and other federal programs. This requirement will impact many 
producers, most of whom have prepared compliance plans which express their intentions 
to adjust tillage practices as necessary to fulfill statutory surface residue requirements. 
The consequences of adjusting tillage practices to achieve conservation compliance have 
not been determined. The impacts on participation rates, wheat production, stocker 
production, farm income, and income variability have not been fully explored. 
The overall objective of the research reported in this thesis was to determine risk 
efficient tillage, government program participation, and stocking strategies for a 
representative Oklahoma farm on which winter wheat is produced for both grain and 
forage. 
Chapter II includes a review of selected literature regarding the economics of the 
alternative tillage systems; impact of government programs on the economics of 
production alternatives; methods used to determine efficient farm plans given government 
programs; and the history of government programs which are relevant to wheat 
production in Oklahoma. 
Chapter III includes a discussion of the concept of risk and the theoretical aspects 
of risk programming. Several risk programming models were discussed. The Target 
MOT AD model as developed by Tauer was presented as an appropriate method for 
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conducting the analysis. 
Model and data development were described in Chapter IV. The chapter contains 
a description of the experiment which generated wheat grain yield data for six alternative 
production systems. Results of the experiment were also presented. 
Information regarding equations which were estimated to determine if a time trend 
could be detected in the experiment station, county, and state average yields was 
presented. No significant trends were detected in any of the three sets of yields. It was 
determined that the experiment station yields were not correlated with market prices. 
Data requirements of the representative farm model and the procedure used to adjust 
wheat and livestock prices for inflation were described. 
Costs of production and gross margins for alternative activities were estimated and 
presented. Government commodity program parameters were presented. Modeling of 
the government programs and its integration with alternative wheat and wheat-stocker 
strategies were explained. 
Results of the risk programming analysis are presented in Chapter V. Farm plans 
are presented which would be appropriate strategies for producers who are risk neutral 
as well as for producers who are risk averse. Plans were prepared for those who farm 
erodible as well as nonerodible land. The major finding of the study are as follows: 
1. A farmer. who prefers risk should not participate in the government program, till 
with moldboard plow, seed all land to wheat, fully stock for winter grazing, and 
harvest the grain. 
2. To maximize utility a risk averse producer who farms nonerodible land should: 
(a) fully participate in the government program; (b) seed the entire farm to wheat; 
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(c) stock the entire acreage for winter grazing; (d) use a moldboard plow on land 
seeded for grain harvest; (e) use a relatively inexpensive tillage system on the 
land seeded for grazeout; (f) grazeout the set aside land; and (g) harvest the rest 
for grain. 
3. A risk averse producer who farms erodible land should: (a) fully participate in the 
government program; (b) seed the entire farm to wheat; (c) stock the entire 
acreage for winter grazing; (d) use the Disk system on land seeded for grain 
harvest; (e) use the relatively inexpensive Sweep system on the land seeded for 
grazeout; (f) harvest for grain the minimum (eighty percent) acreage required to 
qualify for full deficiency payment; and (g) grazeout the set aside (5 percent) and 
mandatory flexible acres (fifteen percent). 
Limitations of the Study 
1. Forage yield data were not available from the experiment station study. 
2. Winter grazing was assumed to have no impact on wheat grain yields and was 
assumed to be constant across all tillage systems. 
3. Stocker weight gain was assumed to be constant across all tillage systems and 
across all states of nature. 
4. A constant stocking density of 0.5 animals per acre was assumed for winter 
grazing and 1. 0 animal per acre for grazeout. 
5. Machinery fixed costs used to estimate the gross margins were based on the 
assumption that the cropping system for which the machinery complement was 
prepared was used on the entire 570 acre farm. Machinery fixed costs may be 
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understated for those plans which call for the use of more than one tillage system. 
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